Not just a vote on Iran

India's longer-term interests will not be served if it cannot balance its international affairs

S D Muni Delhi

When India signed the civil nuclear deal with the United States in July 2005, very few suspected that a hidden cost of the deal would be voting along with the US. The question is not of voting in favour of the US and the European Union-3 resolution and voting against Iran per se. "National interests" can explain the decision at one level, that is, necessity to cooperate with the US and the EU to facilitate the implementation of the civil nuclear deal and recognition for India's place on the nuclear high table, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It has also been argued that western support is critical for India's faster economic growth. Some analysts have also referred to Iran's unfriendly vote on Kashmir in many of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) meetings, its close cooperation with Pakistan and the adversarial impact of Iran's eventual acquisition of nuclear weapons. There are equally powerful counter-arguments to underline the harmful consequences of India's heavy dependence on the US and EU as also lack of consideration for civilisational bonds and friendly cooperation with Iran. The government may be entitled to take a view of what it considers as the right foreign policy choice in pursuance of India's "national interests". 

The critical question in the Iran vote is that India's decision is contrary to its own considered assessment of the issues at stake in Vienna on the Iran nuclear question and that this vote has been forced by the US pressure. Accordingly, this decision has breached the broad national consensus generally prevailing on foreign policy. Recall here the assurances given by India to Iran during the visits of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani to Delhi and the Indian Foreign Minister K. Natwar Singh's visit to Tehran in early September. Natwar Singh also told the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in New York, days before the Vienna vote, that India prefers to deal with the Iran nuclear issue on the basis of consensus and diplomacy. The prime minister had indicated similarly to European leaders including President Chirac of France. The statement made by the Indian representative in Vienna before the vote did not find any fault with Iran. Even the ministry of external affairs (MEA) spokesman said after the vote that, "We have clearly expressed our opposition to Iran being declared as non-compliant with its safeguards agreements. Nor do we agree that the current situation could constitute a threat to international peace and security." Why then did India vote with those who treated Iran as a violator of commitments and want to shift the issue to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a matter of international peace and security?  And India so voted in the face of a US Congressman Tom Lantos using abusive epithets for India's foreign minister and subsequently even bragging that his use of strong words had brought India in line with the US position. This amounts to eroding the credibility of India's foreign policy establishment and exposing the breakdown of consensus between the MEA and the prime minister's office (PMO) not only within India but in the world.

The Iran vote constitutes a clear break from Nehru-Indira Gandhi tradition in India's foreign policy. Both of them had sincerely and seriously endeavoured to build a co-operative and mutually advantageous relationship with the US. Recall Nehru's letter to his close confidante Krishna Menon on the eve of his first official visit to the US in 1949. He asked: "Krishna, why not we align ourselves somewhat with the US to build our economic, scientific and defence capabilities?" However, he returned from his visit frustrated by the United State's arrogance and desire to dominate. He did not find the US willing to deal with India on equal and mutually respectful terms. Indira Gandhi stoutly resisted the US pressures and even military intervention on the issue of Bangladesh in 1971, but following her discussions with the cold warrior President Reagan at Cancun, she started cultivating the US to help facilitate India's military modernisation during the early 1980s. That she could not succeed was due to bottlenecks within the US administration. Self-respect in seeking US cooperation was the principle followed even by lesser-known Congress successors of Nehru and Indira Gandhi. None of the Indian regimes surrendered India's nuclear option, nor did they accommodate US demands for conceding ground on Jammu and Kashmir issue. The United Progressive Alliance regime must convince itself and the country that there was reason to break with this tradition.

The Iran vote is a manifestation of a definite pro-US tilt in India's foreign policy that has been set in motion for the past few years. This slant will persist because the unipolar situation and the aspirations of a rising India demand a mutually reinforcing relationship with the US. Besides, powerful lobbies have emerged and are encouraged in India's key strategic establishments, think tanks and media who find nursing this tilt both professionally and personally rewarding, irrespective of the imperatives of wider national interests. In their assessment, India's route to great power status lies only in piggy-backing the US. These lobbyists have yet to provide hard evidence to the effect that the US is willing to carry the burden of India's aspirations all the way. This tilt, therefore, is in order only as long as it caters to India's legitimate interests.

However, India needs to do something urgently to ensure that the element of succumbing to the uncalled for pressures, inherent in the Iran vote, does not become a precedent. The Iran issue is not closed yet. The US would want India to vote on its side in November when the issue of shifting the debate from the International Atomic Energy Alliance (IAEA) to the UNSC is finally taken up. This may be followed up with imposition of sanctions on Iran and possibly inflicting military action, with or without (if China and Russia exercise veto) the UNSC endorsement. The substantive aspects of civil-nuclear deal with the US have only begun to unfold. The "non-proliferation Ayatollahs" in the US administration, of whom President Bush is acutely aware,  may want to go beyond the Iran issue and impose constraints on India's own nuclear capabilities. They will want India to compromise as they know that twisting of arms may work. The Pakistani demand of "equal treatment" in the nuclear field will prove handy to these vested interests, within and outside the Bush administration, in building a case against India. President Bush may not want or be able to resist such pressures as the Bush shine has already started fading in the US domestic politics. India's vulnerability to US pressures will also expose it to other US demands like concessions from India to Pakistan on the Kashmir question. The latest streak of this could be witnessed in Condoleezza Rice's plea with the prime minister in New York that General Musharraf deserves a face-saving in Kashmir, perhaps in the form of reduction of Indian troops in the valley. Pushed further, the message of the vote on Iran will also vitiate India's position in Asia and its initiatives for constructive long-term relationships with China, Russia and even Europe. After Iran, if the US targets China and Russia for "containment", India surely cannot afford to go along with this approach.

Indian policy makers are aware that the US also needs to cultivate India in its own interests. Given the strong domestic opposition, the Indian government can reason with the US that it cannot go beyond a limit in accommodating the concerns of the United States. The immediate challenge before India is to avoid getting boxed, as it did in Vienna in September, when the issue is taken up again in November. To meet that challenge, India has to activate its diplomacy to facilitate a consensus and a diplomatic resolution of nuclear conflict between the EU and Iran so that a precipitate decision is avoided in November. Another option for the UPA is to call an all-party meeting on the issue and abide by its decision. The Vajpayee government had done that on the question of sending troops to Iraq and it succeeded in avoiding both the embarrassment and the vulnerability. If India fails to meet this immediate challenge its foreign policy will suffer an irreparable damage.

The author is a professor in the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi