A dead end democracy

The coalition in Afghanistan is insufficient, in the long run, in building a state

Moska Najib Delhi

The beginning of 2006 saw a committed continuation of paving democracy for Afghanistan, as the country was once again in the limelight. Afghanistan's remarkable journey to democracy, which many were skeptical of, was highlighted in the two-day conference held in London.

On January 31 and February 1, more than 60 countries and international organisations vowed not to abandon the fragile nation that faced challenging times ahead. With over $10.5 billion pledged for what is called the Afghanistan Compact, the nation looked forward to five more years of international assistance, indeed an endorsement for the next phase of its development.

In brief, the Afghanistan Compact established three necessary and vital issues of development: security, governance and eco-social growth. Furthermore, the plan incorporated ambitious objectives as a means to fulfill the ongoing transformation of the country from tyranny to democracy. These goals consisted of disbanding all illegal militias by 2007, enrolling 60 per cent girls and 75 per cent boys in primary schools by 2010, and exterminating the opium trade. While the success of these aspirations was clearly felt during the conference, the very basis of this democratic foundation, which lies in its two-year old constitution, has often failed to allure the limelight.

On January 4, 2004, when the international community congratulated Afghanistan on the adoption of its new constitution, it seemed that the war-torn nation had finally discovered a channel to struggle out of its long history. Its new regime was determined to depart from the radicalism of the Taliban regime and step towards a nation that would have "free and fair elections" to choose a "fully representative government."
While serving as a symbol of national rule, the Afghan constitution became a functional strategy to establish unifying values and goals, but more importantly it played a vital role in legitimizing regimes and "reestablishing permanent institutions of government" as outlined in the Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001. Yet, its faithful impact and sincerity has remained a weary factor in Afghanistan's political development. Even though it may seem that the government of Afghanistan has thus far met all the deadlines and benchmarks required of it under the Bonn Agreement, these efforts however have not yet put Afghanistan irreversibly on a path to self-reliance and self-sustainability.  

Afghanistan is no stranger to conferences and promises. Donor meetings in Tokyo (2002) and Berlin (2004) promised close to $13 billion in aid, raising hopes and expectations. And London (2006) has once again proven to be another donor conference with more aid, and yet the same obstacles: Afghanistan has become more dependent on narcotics production and trafficking than any other country in the world; it also remains one of the world's most impoverished and conflict-prone states  where only a substantial international presence prevents a return to war.

It is the severity of such volatile conditions that have raised doubts about the compatibility of western notions of state and democracy adapted to Afghan political culture and its new constitution. After all, if constitutions have been redrafted ever since 1923, how much validity could the seventh attempt have for the country's unknown future at stake?