Cry me a river

When a river system is brutalised for big dams, disasters are bound to happen. But why this cover-up?

Himanshu Upadhyaya Delhi

The recent flash floods that submerged Surat and tangentially grabbed the media’s attention were not a divine revelation. When a river regime is brutally tampered with on a gigantic scale, big and small disasters are inevitable. This is the usual story year after year, unless, of course, a major city is involved, in which case the media becomes extra vigilant and over-indulgent. A case in point is Surat which went under water because of flash floods in Tapti river downstream of the Ukai dam.

The Indian Express (August 1, 2005), quoted PK Laheri, Chairman and Managing Director of Sardar Sarovar Narmada Nigam, "I am helpless, tell me what to do." This statement was followed by a case for raising the height of the Sardar Sarovar dam. "All this water could have been saved. Two months of storage in the dam has been lost. If the level had been five metres higher, the curve of power generation would have been optimum. We could have filled up reservoirs in the scarcity-prone areas of Surendrangar and Banaskantha, or released water into more rivers like the Sabarmati. We wanted to do all this in this monsoon. It is unfortunate ... we will have to wait for the next season."

One monsoon later, the question that arises is how effectively have the dam operators in Gujarat utilised the impounded water in the Narmada reservoir? It was widely reported in Gujarati newspapers that the Narmada Main Canal was breached at several places. It was said that from July 28, the canal was carrying 580 cubic feet water per second, even as the inflow of water at the Sardar Sarovar dam was 23,000 cubic feet per second.

The meagre flow into the irrigation canals along with incessant rains upstream led to a sudden rise of water levels. Releases into the river through the powerhouse were just 21,000 cusecs till the dam started overflowing from August 2 onwards. Far from taking impounded waters to other rivers through the irrigation canal, Gujarat was unable to utilise the waters impounded in the reservoir. As a result, within a week, water levels went to a high of 128 metres. Not only was the water when it was released almost twice the drainage capacity of the Tapti river, it was released when the tide was already high, signalling disaster for Surat, villages downstream and Bharuch.

Some blame has to be apportioned for the breaches in the main canals. Who should be held responsible for this deliberate and systematic fiasco? There have been reminders of an institutional vacuum in the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) command area. On August 3, 2004, the UNI reported that the main Narmada Canal collapsed at two places near Bodeli, inundating villages and causing damage to property. Within a week, on August 11, PTI Bhasha flashed a report of the collapse of the Narmada Canal in Viramgam taluka in Ahmedabad district.