Tiger’s tailpiece

Sri Lanka’s pro-LTTE Tamil MPs come calling. And not just for high tea

Pranay Sharma Delhi

Despite South Block's attempts to play it down, the visit of five Tamil MPs from Sri Lanka to New Delhi did not go unnoticed. The delegation of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), the biggest group of Tamil members in the Sri Lankan Parliament, is known for its strong sympathies towards the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE is still a banned organisation in India, despised by many for the ruthless manner in which it disposes of dissenters and political adversaries. The Indian government still

holds the LTTE supreme, Prabhakaran, responsible for unleashing the human-bomb that killed Rajiv Gandhi and others at an election rally in May 1991.

So what is the Indian government doing with a group of Tamil leaders from Sri Lanka who sympathise with the LTTE? "India is the only country that understands the problem in Sri Lanka. And there is a growing feeling, especially among the ethnic Tamil population on the island, that New Delhi must intervene to bring about a lasting peace in Sri Lanka," said R. Sampanthan, leader of the Tamil MPs delegation. “India and the international community must tell the government in Colombo that unless it takes urgent steps to address the aspirations of the Tamils, the territorial unity and integrity of Sri Lanka will be under threat," he added.

Worried over the possible fallout of the TNA leaders' visit to the Capital, South Block has maintained that "too much" should not be read into it. India's cautious approach on the issue is understandable. The debate in the Indian establishment on re-engaging with the Tamil Tigers is not yet over. In fact, the majority opinion, both within and outside the government, is that the LTTE is an organisation that is best left alone.

Several security and defence experts believe the Sri Lankan army's offensive, coupled with years of harassment by breakaway Tiger leader Karuna, has left the LTTE on the defensive. In their view, since the Tamil Tigers are on the run and need time to regroup, they are desperate to enlist India's support.

However, despite apprehensions, the Indian government did invite the TNA members for a dialogue (it is too early to call it a policy shift) and has taken the first tentative step towards playing a more proactive role in the developments in Sri Lanka again. However, while doing so, the government seems to have put enough insulation between itself and the visiting TNA members.  The invitation was issued by the Indian Council on World Affairs (ICWA) and not the government. It was for a seminar, where the visitors from Sri Lanka were expected to interact with scholars and experts on finding a solution to the current political mess in the island nation.

The ICWA is, after all, a government-funded think-tank, and its director-general, Talmiz Ahmad, and several many other officials are from the foreign ministry. In addition, the initial meetings slated between the visitors and Indian leaders and officials, included one with the prime minister. Though the MPs got to meet the national security advisor MK Narayanan and other senior officials in South Block, the meeting with the prime minister was called off at the last minute.

The cancellation of the prime minister’s meeting with the TNA perhaps best exemplifies the contradictions and the pulls and pressures in the establishment in Delhi on the sensitive issue of whether or not to deal with the LTTE. It can be argued that if India can continue to engage with Pakistan, a country which it accuses of being the ‘main source’ of all terrorist activities directed at India, then why should the government shy away from dealing with the LTTE? The Tamil Tigers may not be part of the Sri Lankan government but it is unlikely that a lasting solution to the island’s ethnic problems can be found without the LTTE, or more specifically, without Prabhakaran.

So what makes the Indian leadership reluctant to deal with the LTTE? The main reason for this could be that the LTTE, unlike other terrorist organisations, happened to be close to India at one time. Prabhakaran, and other key members were courted, financed and nurtured by a variety of Indian leaders. The Indian intelligence establishment had earlier given training and logistics support to strengthen the LTTE and helped turn it into one of the deadliest armed organisations in the region.

Relations between Delhi and Prabhakaran soured when serious differences surfaced on the peace accord that Rajiv Gandhi signed with JR Jayawardane in the late 1980s. The decision to bring in the Indian peacekeeping forces to the island was a shrewd move by the wily old Sri Lankan leader. India was sucked into the ethnic conflict and it managed to come out of it finally with terribly deep scars.

The ruthlessness with which the Tamil Tigers carried out Rajiv Gandhi's assassination was the last straw. It was seen in India as the worst kind of "betrayal". Those who till the other day were considered “our boys” by India, overnight turned into its worst enemies.

Can the on-and-off model of Indo-Pak peace process be extended to the Tamil Tigers? There are no clear answers. Some believe that if India wants to play a more meaningful role, it has to reach out to a wider set of players on the island. The developments in Nepal earlier this year taught India the lesson that it is prudent to keep a line of communication open with key players in a conflict, including outfits like the Maoists. "Often, we might have developments in our neighbourhood that might not be to our liking. But we have to be prepared to deal with them. New players might come to the political scene in these countries, people with whom we had no dealings in the past. We have to be prepared to deal with them," the outgoing foreign secretary, Shyam Saran, said a few weeks ago, while outlining India's new policy towards its neighbours in South Asia.

Since the Indian peacekeepers' fiasco and the subsequent assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, Delhi has shown extreme caution. For more than a decade, India has consciously remained on the periphery, allowing other players who have been mediating between Colombo and the LTTE to be more pro-active. India has been particularly careful in defence cooperation. True, it did strengthen its vigil along the sea-lanes with Sri Lanka to ensure that the Sea-Tigers  — the naval wing of the LTTE — were not given a free run to smuggle in their military hardware. But Delhi refused to supply military equipment to Sri Lanka, arguing that any defence cooperation that went beyond sharing military intelligence and guarding the sea-lanes would be unacceptable to the people of Tamil Nadu. They would perceive it as arming the Sri Lankan government to carry out operations against Tamilians in the island's northeast.

This allowed Sri Lanka, however, to shop for its military supplies elsewhere. Over the years, Pakistan has become a key supplier of arms to Sri Lanka. As a result, its influence in the Sri Lankan government has increased. This has caused worry in India. The interaction with the TNA can, therefore, be seen as an attempt by India to send an oblique signal to Colombo — to be temperate in its cordiality towards the Pakistanis. What remains unstated but is implicit is the potential of the India-TNA dialogue turning into a meaningful engagement between Delhi and the LTTE.

However, is it really possible for India to re-engage with the Tigers? So far, non-Congress governments have been wary of even attempting this. If the BJP or any other government had started courting Prabhakaran again, the move would have been resisted by the Congress as being disparaging to the memory of Rajiv Gandhi. Now that the Congress is in power, will it dare break the status quo?

The decision cannot be entirely the prime minister's and that of his close aides. It can only come from Congress president Sonia Gandhi. She and her family have been the worst sufferers of the assassination. If at all, it is Sonia Gandhi, who will finally decide.  But it will not be easy for her either. In the past, there have been insinuations by some politicians on how Sonia Gandhi benefited from her husband's death. Luckily, such insinuations have remained limited to a negligible section. But the stakes are high for Sonia Gandhi's Congress as well as her political opponents. Will Sonia risk reaching out to the LTTE?

The TNA MPs who came to test the Indian political waters also realise that Rajiv Gandhi's assassination continues to be a major stumbling block between India and the LTTE. The LTTE spokesperson, Anton Balasingham, "regretted" the assassination, though he did not say that the LTTE was responsible. The TNA delegation referred to his remark, "The LTTE, having made the start, will have to move forward and make the people of India appreciate that they deeply regret this incident. In due course of time that will become a reality."

Till that day, a possible dialogue between India and the LTTE will perhaps be held only in ‘proxy’.