Bang goes the bomb

With no WMDs and the Iraq occupation in a shambles, what lessons should Iran and North Korea draw from George Bush’s bullying tactics?

Pranay Sharma Delhi

Myopia and amnesia are terms rarely used in diplomacy. But that does not mean that nations and diplomats do not suffer from these ailments. Indeed, the North Korean nuclear test last month is a prime example of how myopia and amnesia have been fine-tuned into an effective time-tested strategy in the deceptive realm of global diplomacy.

After posturing for nearly 12 years, North Korea did what it had been threatening to do: it went nuclear. But Pyongyang’s decision to conduct its first nuclear test should not be seen in isolation. It has wide ramifications not only for the region but for the entire world.

The test has upset the apple cart that powerful international players, particularly the US, had erected so carefully in the past few decades. While it raises uncomfortable questions on the international non-proliferation regime, it has brought President George W. Bush’s concept of “the axis of evil” under serious scrutiny.

For China, which has been North Korea’s main supporter all these years, it was a major embarrassment to be informed about the test by Pyongyang only ten minutes before it was conducted. The test has forced many countries, such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, to seriously reconsider their anti-nuclear policy. Although all of them have assured the US that they were satisfied being under the American nuclear umbrella and will not conduct tests, the position could change if the scenario takes a turn for the worse.

Undoubtedly, the focus will now be squarely on another nuclear aspirant: Iran. For some years now, the leadership in Teheran has been engaged in a cat-and-mouse game with the international community. While Iran has maintained its eagerness to continue negotiations with the world powers, it has shown

no signs of giving up its nuclear

programme.

However, it is about time to see why North Korea did what it did? Since 1994, the leadership in Pyongyang had made its intentions clear that it wanted to go nuclear. During Bill Clinton’s presidency, the US, through the mediation of former president Jimmy Carter, managed to dissuade North Korea from pursuing its nuclear weapons programme. As a trade-off, it was promised light water reactors, financial and other assistance from the US. The arrangement seemed to have worked. North Korea did not give up its weapons programme totally, but it did keep the weapon making plutonium reactor under the supervision

of international inspectors.

Things, however, changed with the arrival of Bush in end 2000; he said that he was not willing to soft-pedal when it comes to North Korea. Hence, he imposed financial sanctions on Pyongyang and made no bones about the fact that he was making every effort to bring about a regime change in North Korea. Kim Jong Il reacted in a predictable manner. He threw out the international inspectors and went ahead full-steam with his nuclear weapons programme.

It was China that took the initiative in 2003 to moot the idea of the six-party talks, in which North Korea, the US, South Korea, Japan, Russia and China became parties to bring about an amicable solution. Despite occasional hiccups, the talks continued till North Korea broke away and conducted the nuclear test.