Dragon uneasy

China starts worrying as talks on a trilateral cooperation between India, Japan and the US on the emerging security scenario in the Asia-Pacific region gets off the ground

Pranay Sharma Delhi

For Beijing, whenever the United States and Japan get together to plan something, it means bad news. It gets worse when they try to rope in India. It becomes positively scary when China is not invited to the party.

The proposed trilateral cooperation between India, Japan and the US to deal with the emerging security scenario in the Asia-Pacific region is still at the embryonic stage. Members of leading think-tanks of the three countries have met only twice to toss the idea around. It has, however, already grabbed China's attention and alarm bells in Beijing are about to go off.

"It would not be a military alliance, nor would it be aimed at China," Ashley Tellis, a former US State Department official and a senior associate at the Washington-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace tried to reassure during a recent meeting in New Delhi. He explained that the aim of the three countries would be to work closely with each other to keep the sea lanes free of trouble, tackle global terrorism and evolve a common policy on other security-related issues. However, Tellis was unambiguous in stating that one of the key objectives of the trilateral cooperation would also be to ensure that no single country becomes a dominant force in Asia.

It is this particular objective that has started worrying China. The leadership in Beijing sees it as yet another attempt to encircle and isolate China. Why else would China be left out of this cooperation? "The points and the objectives stated by Tellis could only be successful if China is made to cooperate in these efforts. Unless, of course, the main objective is to create an anti-China front in Asia," a Chinese foreign policy expert said, hinting at the obvious intentions to exclude China from the grouping.

The Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's recent visit to Japan has only added to China's aggravation since it took place within days of Tellis’ attempt to outline the main objectives of the proposed trilateral cooperation. The head of China's foreign policy establishment and state councillor, Tang Jia Xuan, would be in New Delhi next month. While here, Tang would try to find out from the Indian leadership what the trilateral cooperation means and what role India wants to play in it.

Historically, the ‘Middle Kingdom’, China has traditionally feared attempts by adversaries to encircle it. For the past years China has been trying to build its economic muscle while steadily attempting to remove strains from bilateral relations and strengthening ties with countries like India.

But its relation with Japan has been another matter. Sino-Japanese ties have gone from bad to worse. From being the largest recipient of Japan's Overseas Developmental Assistance (ODA), Beijing has become the main target of Tokyo's belligerent postures. The two sides have ‘sparred’ over ‘what Japan did-or-did-not-do’ when it occupied China during World War II.

In a way, India has been one of the main beneficiaries of this brinkmanship between the two East Asian neighbours. Two years ago when China entered into a ‘strategic partnership’ with India, it took Japan only a fortnight to enter into a similar partnership with New Delhi. As bilateral trade between India and China galloped to the US$ 22 billion mark, Japan decided to significantly increase both its ODA and investments in India. If China offered a partnership to India to reshape the future of Asia, Japan insisted on New Delhi's inclusion in the East Asian Summit to ensure that India is counted as one of the major forces in the region.

China, never known to jump the gun, has decided to adopt a ‘wait-and-watch’ policy to see how the proposed trilateral cooperation between the three countries evolves. "A lot would depend on what India does as we already know about the intentions of the US and Japan," a Chinese expert said.

On its part, India has decided to make the most of the current attention and focus that it has been getting from the world at large. Some would argue that a lot of this was made possible only after India improved and strengthened its ties with the US. This is true to a large extent. Many countries, particularly China and Japan, started taking India seriously only after New Delhi's ties with Washington reached a new high. The leadership in Beijing felt it was better to have India as a ‘neutral’ player in Asia rather than having it as part of the US-alliance. Japan’s decision to move closer to India might have been prompted by the assessment that New Delhi could become an ally in the coming days to counter China’s growing influence in the region.

Despite the growing perception of India’s closeness with the US, the Indian leadership has so far not done anything drastic that would allow it to be seen as a part of the a US alliance. Some years ago, when most thought India would end up rallying behind the Americans during the Iraq war, New Delhi politely turned down Washington’s request to send Indian troops to Iraq. More recently, when India ended up voting against Iran at the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) Board of Governors’ meeting, it made sure that its decision tallied not only with the US but also with Russia, China and most of the other members on the board.

The Chinese leadership knows that its relations with Japan would take a long time to mend as neither side is prepared to shed the historic baggage. It is also aware that despite the strong economic and trade ties it has with the US, they might find themselves in opposite camps in the coming days.

A lot, therefore, depends on what India does. Sino-Indian relations have only started to show some signs of maturity. The two, along with Russia, have begun to revive a trilateral cooperation that could bring all of them closer into facing the challenges of the 21st century. Beijing’s decision to pursue a policy to strengthen ties with India that is independent of its relations with Pakistan has been well received in the South Block.

Some see the proposed trilateral cooperation as an attempt on the US’ part to build strong relations with countries like India and Japan to circumvent the United Nations (UN). A new Presidency in Washington might lay more stress on multilateral approaches rather than unilateral ones. At least, that is the general belief after the Iraq war.

That does not necessarily mean the US would be inclined to go through the UN route to pursue its strategic goals. It is aware that many of its proposals could be thwarted in the UN Security Council by Russia and China. The attempt, therefore, could be to look beyond the UN and forge an alliance with new but like-minded countries. Since the US, along with most others, has identified Asia-Pacific as the most important region in the near future, the proposed trilateral cooperation could be used to achieve strategic goals.

The Taiwan issue could possibly be the litmus test not only for Sino-India relations but also for China's relations with the US. The leadership in the tiny island is trying to declare independence at the end of the year. Japan in all probability would continue to encourage Taiwan to take an independent line to spite China.

Would Washington end up supporting the move that could lead to an end to the ‘One China’ policy that the US and most other key players in the world have accepted so far? If that happens, what would India do? Would New Delhi end up with the anti-Beijing forces or would it continue to support the ‘One China’ policy to maintain its neutrality? These are questions that are not only bothering the leadership in China but also many others in different parts of the world.