To trust or to quibble?

Indian and Pakistani leaders need to accept ground realities and move forward with the demilitarisation process

Gurmeet Kanwal Delhi

The Indo-Pak peace process has been stuck in a groove for over a year since the Mumbai train blasts followed by terrorist strikes on the Samjhauta Express earlier this year. Although the two foreign secretaries met at Islamabad in March, nothing substantive was achieved. The defence secretaries met on April 6 and 7, 2007 at Islamabad to discuss Siachen and Sir Creek and, again, the talks were inconclusive. Pakistan insists that there must be some tangible progress on Kashmir for the rapprochement to gather momentum, while India continues to reiterate that it is necessary to first build confidence by resolving relatively less intractable problems.

Due to little progress in the relationship, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh failed to visit Islamabad for a return summit meeting and, consequently, General Musharraf declined India’s invitation to attend the SAARC summit at New Delhi. Indian analysts are now saying that India has decided to go slow on the peace process as it is waiting for the situation unfolding in Islamabad to play itself out. The only silver lining recently has been that a neutral expert’s award on the Baglihar dam project has been accepted by both countries.

Both sides have been finding it difficult to overcome their negotiation mindsets and are unable to look for innovative approaches. India insists that the present defensive positions of both armies on the Saltoro Range along the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) should be demarcated so that there is a reference point in case a dispute arises. Pakistan’s position is that by suddenly occupying the Saltoro Range west of the Siachen Glacier, India violated the 1972 Shimla Agreement and must, therefore, undo its “aggression” without insisting on legitimising its illegal occupation.

The Indian army’s position that the AGPL must be jointly verified and demarcated is justifiable military advice. However, Pakistan today is in no position to violate an international agreement. In case Pakistan occupies any of the posts vacated by India, it will be branded an international pariah. In its present state of being on the receiving end for not doing enough in the war on terror and in the face of a Jihadi siege within, Pakistan can not afford further opprobrium. India should insist on building into the agreement the clause that in case of a violation, both sides reserve the right to take whatever action they may deem fit including military measures. At the same time, India should maintain suitably structured ready reserves in Ladakh and Kashmir for counter-action across the LoC at a point of its choosing.

As soon as a political agreement to demilitarise the Siachen conflict zone is reached, the disengagement process can begin with the Indian and Pakistani armies negotiating its basic framework. The two DGMOs, assisted by civilian representatives, can together chair a Joint Working Group (JWG) to finalise the modalities of the disengagement, monitoring and verification process. This JWG should decide the extent of the area to be included in the demilitarised zone  and the stages of demilitarisation. The JWG should also work out the time-frame for the process of disengagement to be completed.

Monitoring of the disengagement process to ensure compliance with the demilitarisation agreement can be done to the mutual satisfaction of both parties by using technical means such as aerial and satellite imagery, reconnaissance through manned fixed wing aircraft and helicopter sorties, side-looking airborne radars and by using UAVs while flying well within one’s own airspace.

The demilitarisation of the Siachen conflict zone will act as a confidence- building measure of immense importance. It is an idea whose time has come. The last stumbling block can be removed by the Indian and Pakistani leaders finding the political will necessary to accept ground realities. Trust begets trust and it will be well worth taking a political and military risk to give peace a chance. The demilitarisation of Siachen is a low-risk option to test Pakistan’s long-term intentions. However, it cannot be initiated till the government begins the process of building a national consensus around this important bilateral measure.

The writer is Senior Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi