The SAARC process has been full of pompous promises, with little action. Hope lies in the civil society, outside the fears and mistrust of cross-border status quo
Mahendra P Lama Delhi
One glaring aspect of contemporary South Asia has been the feebleness of peace and cooperation in the region. Somehow, the traditional constructs of security based on pure geo-political concepts of threat continues to rule the roost despite the end of the Cold War, globalisation-led economic reforms, leap-frogging in communication and changing alignments in the region. That is why a regional organisation like the SAARC has not really moved forward.
The SAARC process has only been full of rhetoric, with little action. Even the declaration of the recently held 14th SAARC Summit has nothing substantive to offer. Except for a South Asian University, this summit could not offer anything more, not even a full and final implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement.
There are plenty of examples of non-action in the past 22 years of the SAARC. The Poverty Commission Report of 1992 set formidable macro-economic targets for the eradication of poverty in the region by 2002. The region would require an annual growth rate of 9.1 per cent, doubling of per capita income from $300 to $600, lowering of incremental capital-output ratio from 4:1 to 3:1 and increasing the marginal savings rate from the current level to 27 per cent or more. Every summit stuck to the unrealistic deadline for the eradication of poverty. However, in the Kathmandu Summit in 2002, leaders quietly appointed a new Poverty Commission. They failed to implement even the most basic recommendation of the last commission regarding the exchange of views, ideas and sharing of experiences of a range of successful micro-level interventions made across South Asia's grassroots. Poverty has become much more diabolical and intensive in the post-reforms period.
Not a single project under the non-controversial areas of cooperation known as the Integrated Programme of Action has been implemented. Hardly 14 per cent of the total hydro potential of 231,000 MW is harnessed. Bhutan's Chukha project, which annually fetches it almost $33 million, is an approach to emulate. The Mahakali Treaty, gas from Bangladesh and through Pakistan, and power trade in the region, need to be brought at the regional forum. Bilateralism cannot be a substitute to regionalism. The fact is, the Southern African Power Pool, a major example of regional energy integration, has been built despite the presence of South Asia-like suspicion, ingrained mistrust and fears of the ‘small nation syndrome’ among members in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).
However, there is a strong undercurrent of a newer regionalism discourse emerging across South Asia. Softer and humane issues like human security are acquiring core importance. The critical roles of non-state actors are being realised. Stakeholders outside the government and State conglomerations are emerging as vital and decisive. Besides the traditional State policy planners, a far more extensive set of actors are emerging across the region. They have started questioning the State's monopoly in determining various matrices of security issues.
These actors include transnational religious organisations, environmental groups, human rights organisations, regional economic cooperatives, local communities, the MNCs, diasporas and migrants/refugees. They have entered into various forms of cooperation and collaboration. They vary from informal coalitions to global conferences, the NGOs to non-official, national, regional and international institutions. In the collective action of these newer forces lies the future of regionalism in South Asia. There are adequate indications that these non-official SAARC machineries will ultimately drive the regional integration process.
India's role in this region is pivotal. Yet, it is a basket of contradictions. While remaining a strong advocate of multilateralism at the global forum, India has consistently adhered to the bilateral route in its approach to neighbouring countries. This strategy was effective in some situations. It has become increasingly irrelevant because crucial issues including that of market, energy security, investment, natural resources-sharing and non-traditional security variables like environmental concerns, terrorism and migration have become more regional in character. In fact, regionalism could also dilute many of the nagging bilateral problems and pave the way for more positive engagement with the neighbours.
There are several factors that could support this transition from the two decade-old shallow approach to a robust and mature form of regionalism. South Asia can provide the bigger space that India needs in order to cater to its market expansion and garner politico-strategic support.
China and others are fast expanding their influence and accessibility in the region. Pakistan has become the hub of Chinese investment. They are eyeing to access the Indian market in a durable manner. China has steadily transformed itself from an astute proponent of ideological influence and covert supporter of insurgency to a builder of cross-border modern infrastructures and wild market grabber.
The observer status has fulfilled China's silent quest to enter the SAARC. This is another route through which China could effectively enter the South Asian market. China has never been part of the sub-continental past, its political ethos and cultural panorama, may not fit into this region's complex socio-economic composition. Possibly, to camouflage this oddity, the US, EU, Japan and South Korea have also been given the same status in the SAARC. China, however, can make a big difference in either consolidating the SAARC through substantive cooperation, or erode its functioning through counter-active action against the traditionally established pivotal role of India. China's SAARC venture is parallel and germane to its membership of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, where it is doggedly trying to be a full-fledged member. The vital role it played in the last two East Asia Summits in Malaysia and Philippines only shows that it aspires to remain within the region and thwart the other global powers collectively.
India can no longer afford to be negatively engaged in the neighbourhood. This means political instabilities and conflicts, anti-Indian activities and economic deceleration in the neighbourhood that could be as costly to India as they are to these countries. Therefore, India has the responsibility to make a major dent in the regionalism process and generate a broader and deeper Indian constituency.
More than anything else, the people in the region want India to play a critical, proactive and sustained role. This is manifested in increasing linkages among democratic forces, people-to-people contacts, networking among professional bodies, coming together of influential NGOs, demand for cross border economic activities, regional approaches in natural disaster management and the people's support to free trade agreement like the one with Sri Lanka, leading to a comprehensive economic partnership agreement. This is precisely the optimistic and rational way out.
The writer is professor of South Asian Economies, School of International Studies, JNU, Delhi

What are our readers are saying?
3 weeks 4 days ago
4 weeks 12 hours ago
4 weeks 3 days ago
4 weeks 5 days ago
5 weeks 6 days ago
5 weeks 6 days ago
5 weeks 6 days ago
5 weeks 6 days ago
6 weeks 5 hours ago
6 weeks 4 days ago