For a little peace of Island

Although Lankan forces have an upper hand in the Eelam war, the LTTE is no walkover. In the long run, the military approach could prove to be futile

SD Muni Delhi

The ‘Eelam War IV’, sparked off a year-and-half back in Sri Lanka between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and President Mahinda Rajapakse’s forces, has entered a highly intensive phase. Since the launch of ‘Operation Definite Victory’ by the Sri Lankan forces in January 2007, air attacks have been carried out on the LTTE installations. Nearly 100,000 people have been internally displaced (IDP) from the eastern and northern Tamil dominated areas, swelling the number of IDP to about 300,000. Another 4,000 have lost their lives, adding to the 70,000 casualties in this ethnic conflict so far since 1980. There is a growing trickle of refugees coming to the Indian shores in the latest phase, notwithstanding the assurances and efforts of the Colombo authorities to prevent such a spillover.

The Sri Lankan forces have an upper hand. They have overrun more than 16 of the major Tiger military camps, and pushed them almost completely out of the eastern province. There are indications of doggedness in the government’s military campaign coupled with a confidence that it is a winnable war; or at least that the military thrashing can force the LTTE to come to the negotiating table on the government’s terms.

Rajapakse and his brother Gotabhaya (a military officer elevated as defence secretary) have been the main drivers behind the military approach with the support of the security forces. It is claimed that this approach enjoys wide popular support in the Sinhala south of the island. In its enthusiasm to win this war, the Sri Lankan government has been ignoring protests against the gross violations of human rights raised by a number of international organisations. There are increasing curbs on the press and freedom of ordinary people, including unaccounted disappearances. The editor of a popular newspaper Daily Mirror was threatened by the president’s brother over critical reports from the war front in eastern province. 

Two developments have decisively boosted the Sri Lankan forces’ morale and yielded military successes to them. One is the split in the LTTE ranks, leading to the defection of battle-hardened eastern commander Col. Karuna. He broke from Prabhakaran in March 2004 to ally with the Sri Lankan forces. His knowledge of the LTTE and his experience in organising military manoeuvres have proved to be of great value to Colombo in this war.

The second facilitating factor has been the growing international isolation of the LTTE. Both the US and European Union (EU) have started tightening screws on the LTTE’s international support and fund-raising. The EU proscribed the LTTE as a terrorist organisation in May 2006. The LTTE activists in Europe and Australia have faced the heat and many members have been arrested. Its arms supply routes and financial flows are being closely monitored.

The military campaign has visibly weakened the LTTE but its political will to fight for Eelam has not been daunted. This was evident on March 26, 2007 when two micro-light aircrafts bearing the ‘Tamil Eelam Air Force’ emblem attacked a Sri Lankan Air Force station in Katunayake airport to target the ‘kafir’ and Mig-27 hangars. The precise extent of damage caused to the Lankan Air Force is not known; three air force personnel were killed and 20 injured.

For a long time there have been reports of the Tigers’ air force wing. In 2006 it was even claimed by the Sri Lankan Air Force that some Tiger airstrips were destroyed. The thrust of the Tigers’ air power in the ‘Eelam War IV’ has given it a serious dimension. The Tigers, at least as yet, may not be in a position to engage its adversary in a conventional air war, but acquisition of air power gives them an unprecedented tool to inflict damage on Sri Lanka. Reacting to the Sri Lankan threat of “going after the Tamil heartland” militarily, the LTTE leader, Tamilshelvan, said, “If the worst comes, of course,  Colombo and its chauvinistic forces will realise what the full capacity of the LTTE is, and the impact would be very serious.”

This is not for the first time that the LTTE is under military pressure. The image created by the LTTE, that it is militarily invincible, is exaggerated and misleading. On three occasions, in 1987, 1990 and 1995, it was cornered in the Vanni jungles; but it has bounced back. This is largely due to its political resilience, whereby it seeks talks, arranges ceasefires, regroups and carries the fight further for Eelam. The inherent strength of the LTTE’s political resilience arises from two factors. One is the cynide capsule and suicide commandos, an indicator of its commitment to the cause even at the cost of the lives of its cadres. The other is Sinhala reluctance to politically accommodate the demands of the Tamil community.

In many ways, the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is a product of the power struggle between the two mainstream Sinhala parties—the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP). The former president Chandrika Kumaratunga has been the only Sinhala leader who sincerely came close to accommodating Tamil demands in 1995 within federal parameters. Even a diluted version of her political proposals secured a broad bipartisan approval in 2000, but her initiative was lost out on political count when the opposition the UNP refused to accord it parliamentary approval. Just before the end of her term, she also concluded an agreement with the LTTE to work together on reconstruction of Tsunami-affected areas. Rajapakse promised to reinvent a political package for the Tamils, but the president’s political manipulations have driven them out of that promise. 

As long as Colombo’s military approach is not accompanied by a credible political offer, endorsed by broad Sinhala consensus, to accommodate the larger Tamil interests, there will be no end to the conflict in Sri Lanka. Accordingly, in response to international pressures, the military thrust of the Rajapakse government is accompanied by a calculated rhetoric: that a political package is being prepared to accommodate the demands of the Tamil community. If this package addresses the concerns of the Tamil community, which lives mostly (more than 55 per cent) outside the control of the Tigers, the LTTE can be isolated.

Some of the non-LTTE Tamil groups—Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) have come out with a demand for settlement within a federal framework. The Rajapakse government has promised to unveil a political package by the end of April, 2007. One, however, wonders about the acceptability of such a package by the Tamil majority; and will it be backed by the regime’s Sinhala opponents, if and when it is put forward?

India is affected mostly by the spillover of the war, but it does not want to plunge into the conflict directly and be discredited, like the Norwegian facilitators. As long as the refugee flow from across the Palk Strait is controlled and none of the combatants is on the verge of an outright victory, Delhi can afford to mull over its options. India’s hands are tied in other neighbourhood challenges. It would serve its interests better if it moved quietly but firmly towards rebuilding a non-LTTE front in favour of a democratic, plural and peaceful solution. Besides, it has to nudge the dominant mainstream Sinhala forces towards the futility of a military approach and in favour of credible political accommodation of Tamil aspirations.

The writer is Executive Director,  Observer Research Foundation