Asking for apocalypse

There is no doubt that the US-India nuclear deal is a bad strategic and energy bargain

Praful Bidwai Delhi

As negotiations to finalise the United States-India nuclear deal enter what is likely to be their ultimate phase, it is apparent that the Bush administration's options are limited. It cannot propose a bilateral '123 agreement' on terms that differ significantly from those of the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, passed last December.

Bluntly put, it is India that will have to “adjust” its expectations and policies to the Hyde Act in respect of the sticking-points that remain: the scope of bilateral nuclear “cooperation”; guarantees of uninterrupted supply of fuel and spares; India's “right” to reprocess imported fuel; and the consequences of another nuclear weapons test by India. As Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association (which opposes the deal), puts it: “(E)ven if the Bush administration wanted to, the US negotiators simply do not have the leeway to concede much more to India.”

This puts Manmohan Singh in a bind. Singh made solemn commitments to Parliament that there would be no departure from the original July 2005 agreement, which says the US accepts that “as a responsible State with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states… (such as the US).” Since then, Indian hardliner lobbies, especially Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) officials, have raised the bar by underlining the centrality of the “right” to reprocess fuel because India's long-term nuclear programme hinges on reprocessed plutonium, to be used in fast-breeder reactors.

This “right” is unlikely to be conceded, unless there is a dramatic shift in the US stand. Nor does the Bush administration have the will or political capital to demand of Congress that the US should continue nuclear cooperation even if India conducts another nuclear blast.

A “123 agreement” that substantially differs from commitments made to Parliament is bound to invite the charge that the government has compromised India's sovereignty.

However, even more important than this procedural case against the deal is a substantive argument that critiques its strategic consequences and energy implications. In essence, the deal is about admitting India to the Global Nuclear Club, led by its most powerful and weapons-addicted member, the US —as part of an emerging unequal US-India “strategic partnership”. It will legitimise India's nuclear weapons although India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In return, India will also sanctify the US's nuclear weapons.

India will thus jettison the cause of global nuc-lear disarmament which it has championed for 60 years, and to which the UPA promised to return. This will set a negative example and further weaken the case for restraint on the part of the non-nuclear states. Contrary to propaganda, the deal won't promote restraint on India's part. India's military-nuclear capacity will 'increase'. By importing uranium for its civilian programme, India can dedicate domestic uranium exclusively to weapons. India's nuclear weapons pursuit, with US approval, will provide ammunition to countries like Iran and North Korea, and could provoke a rethink in states that renounced nuclear weapons, like Germany, Japan, Sweden, Brazil and South Africa. The deal will create resentment in Pakistan — at a time when the India-Pakistan dialogue is delicately poised. It could also intensify an arms race not just with Pakistan, but with China.