Borderline case

Ignore the hawks on both sides. China’s refusal to issue a visa to an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh, claiming the state as its territory, is a complex diplomatic tangle on boundary disputes

Srinath Raghavan London

The Sino-Indian boundary dispute is in news again. In the last week of May, China refused to issue a visa to an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese contended that since they claimed the state as their territory, the officer did not require a visa. Against this backdrop, when the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers met a few days later, the latter reportedly said that the presence of settled populations in disputed areas would not affect China's claims on them. Further, an opposition MP from Arunachal Pradesh claimed that Chinese patrols were continuing to encroach on Indian territory. These developments have been construed as indicating China's persisting territorial designs. Hawkish commentators have gone so far as to charge the government with appeasement of China.

What exactly is China's stand on Arunachal Pradesh? How does it relate to the overall boundary dispute? To understand these, we must go back in time.

During the summit of April 1960, the Chinese suggested that if India accepted their claims in the western sector (Ladakh), they would adopt a reasonable stance in the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh). While they would not recognise the McMahon Line, they might agree to a boundary not very different from it. This position reflected the domestic constraints on the Chinese government, especially because they had denounced the line as a relic of imperialism and had claimed the entire sector. As their foreign minister Chen Yi told cabinet minister Swaran Singh, on a trip to Agra in 1960, “If the Chinese government recognises the Simla convention and the McMahon Line, there would be an explosion in China and the Chinese people would not agree. Premier Chou has no right to do so.”

Beijing was apparently ready to forsake its claims in the east, except in certain places. These were 'grey areas' which lay north of the McMahon Line as marked in the original maps of 1914 but were actually south of the highest watershed. India's position  — which China did not accept — was that the line was supposed to run along the watershed; hence, despite discrepancies, it ought to be interpreted as such.

India was focused on the western sector. Here, China claimed not just Aksai Chin but areas south and south-west of it as well. India rejected the idea of a 'swap', partly because the Chinese were nowhere near their claim-line in Ladakh. China, in fact, came to occupy these areas only after the 1962 war.

As far as the eastern sector was concerned, the Indians mistakenly believed that China had sought no concessions. As foreign secretary Subimal Dutt informed Indian ambassadors after the summit in 1960: “The Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). This laid the ground for misapprehensions in the future.

When Deng Xiaoping revived the idea of a package-deal in 1980, India refused to consider it. Believing that China was ready to abandon its claims in the east, India called for a sector-by-sector approach, starting with the east. The idea was that once China acceded to India's position here, it would politically be easier for Delhi to make concessions in the west. Domestic politics also mandated that India should secure Chinese withdrawal at least from the 3,000 square miles in Ladakh annexed in 1962: the government could not be seen as acquiescing in the gains of war.