Borderline case

Ignore the hawks on both sides. China’s refusal to issue a visa to an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh, claiming the state as its territory, is a complex diplomatic tangle on boundary disputes

Srinath Raghavan London

The Sino-Indian boundary dispute is in news again. In the last week of May, China refused to issue a visa to an IAS officer from Arunachal Pradesh. The Chinese contended that since they claimed the state as their territory, the officer did not require a visa. Against this backdrop, when the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers met a few days later, the latter reportedly said that the presence of settled populations in disputed areas would not affect China's claims on them. Further, an opposition MP from Arunachal Pradesh claimed that Chinese patrols were continuing to encroach on Indian territory. These developments have been construed as indicating China's persisting territorial designs. Hawkish commentators have gone so far as to charge the government with appeasement of China.

What exactly is China's stand on Arunachal Pradesh? How does it relate to the overall boundary dispute? To understand these, we must go back in time.

During the summit of April 1960, the Chinese suggested that if India accepted their claims in the western sector (Ladakh), they would adopt a reasonable stance in the eastern sector (Arunachal Pradesh). While they would not recognise the McMahon Line, they might agree to a boundary not very different from it. This position reflected the domestic constraints on the Chinese government, especially because they had denounced the line as a relic of imperialism and had claimed the entire sector. As their foreign minister Chen Yi told cabinet minister Swaran Singh, on a trip to Agra in 1960, “If the Chinese government recognises the Simla convention and the McMahon Line, there would be an explosion in China and the Chinese people would not agree. Premier Chou has no right to do so.”

Beijing was apparently ready to forsake its claims in the east, except in certain places. These were 'grey areas' which lay north of the McMahon Line as marked in the original maps of 1914 but were actually south of the highest watershed. India's position  — which China did not accept — was that the line was supposed to run along the watershed; hence, despite discrepancies, it ought to be interpreted as such.

India was focused on the western sector. Here, China claimed not just Aksai Chin but areas south and south-west of it as well. India rejected the idea of a 'swap', partly because the Chinese were nowhere near their claim-line in Ladakh. China, in fact, came to occupy these areas only after the 1962 war.

As far as the eastern sector was concerned, the Indians mistakenly believed that China had sought no concessions. As foreign secretary Subimal Dutt informed Indian ambassadors after the summit in 1960: “The Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh). This laid the ground for misapprehensions in the future.

When Deng Xiaoping revived the idea of a package-deal in 1980, India refused to consider it. Believing that China was ready to abandon its claims in the east, India called for a sector-by-sector approach, starting with the east. The idea was that once China acceded to India's position here, it would politically be easier for Delhi to make concessions in the west. Domestic politics also mandated that India should secure Chinese withdrawal at least from the 3,000 square miles in Ladakh annexed in 1962: the government could not be seen as acquiescing in the gains of war.

Although China accepted this approach, it began to emphasise its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, particularly over Tawang which has had traditional ties with Tibet. Beijing reckoned that if concessions in one sector are not linked to gains in another, it was sensible to negotiate to push for the maximum in each. Besides, domestic constraints had increased over the years. The Chinese had to obtain some favourable adjustments in the east.

In the following years, at India's insistence, the discussions were centred on clarifying the Line of Actual Control (LAC). An agreement on maintaining peace along the LAC signed in 1996 admitted that the two sides had differing perceptions of the LAC. Subsequently, it was identified that in the eastern sector these were in the grey areas along the McMahon Line: Namka Chu, Thag La, Sumdurong Chu, Tulung La, Asaphi La, Longju, and Chen Ju. The claims about Chinese incursions that are periodically aired in India pertain to these parts.

In July 2003, when there was uproar over Chinese movements in Asaphi La, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesman accepted that “this is an area where there are differences in perception”. In response to the recent allegations of Chinese intrusions, a senior Prime Minister's Office (PMO) official was quoted that “it is only in the disputed parts (of the LAC) in the eastern sector that (Chinese) patrolling takes place”. The official acknowledged that “both sides send patrols to these areas”. To deal with such “incursions”, the 1996 agreement allows the parties to seek clarifications through diplomatic channels — a mechanism that India has utilised. 

The current round of negotiations on the boundary began in 2003. The bottomlines of both countries remained unchanged. Delhi needed a Chinese withdrawal by at least 3,000 sq miles in the western sector. Beijing sought concessions in the grey areas in the eastern sector. The political parameters agreed upon in April 2005 took these into account. Both sides would work towards a package settlement involving all sectors. They agreed the boundary would follow well-defined geographic features. Contrary to India's position, China holds that a watershed is not the only such feature. This relates to its expectations in the eastern sector. Finally, the agreement would safeguard the interests of settled populations in disputed areas.

This last point amounted to a tacit acceptance by China that its claims over most of Arunachal Pradesh were notional. But it is naïve to expect Beijing to stop pressing its claims. The state, especially Tawang, is its bargaining chip — not only to obtain concessions in this sector, but also to avoid having to give up too much in Ladakh. Indeed, the Chinese have refrained from any moves that might suggest a dilution of their claims. They have consistently refused to grant visas to Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh. While China's style might seem brazen, its stance in not surprising. After all, India continues to claim the areas held by China in the west. Both sides will relinquish their claims only after a boundary accord is reached.

Critics who berate the government for failing to take a “tough stand” should realise that these negotiations are not about assertion of rights but about reconciliation of interests. The numerous rounds of discussions between the Special Representatives testify to the difficulty of this task. The remarks of the Chinese foreign minister suggest that the bargaining process has entered an intense phase.

Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee has told his Chinese counterpart that the government could not cede any part of its territory that sends representatives to Parliament. During his recent meeting with President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has reaffirmed that negotiations must be governed by the 2005 parameters, that is, uprooting settled populations is unacceptable to India. This still leaves India with some room to accommodate Chinese interests in the east. The challenge is to move forward in this direction, while simultaneously ensuring that India's security interests are preserved and the concerns of the domestic audience are addressed. Beijing, too, faces a similar task.

Setbacks are integral in any negotiations of this kind. By reacting in a measured fashion, the Indian government has done the right thing. Certainly, these are the delicate times when patience and perseverance need to be demonstrated.