Theocracy in military green

Pakistan is not destined to be a dictatorship. South Asia has a big stake in a Pakistan that is politically and religiously moderate, pluralist, inclusive and committed to subordinating its military to civilian control

Praful Bidwai Delhi

The cataclysmic events at Lal Masjid in Islamabad, which led to its storming, have delivered a seismic shock to Pakistan. Whether or not the mosque's takeover by radical jehadi elements was inspired by Al-Qaeda's plans to open a 'new front' in Pakistan, as some reports allege, its consequences have proved nearly as dramatic as the September 2001 bombings in highlighting the menace that militant Wahhabi Islam represents in different parts of the world, including Muslim-majority countries.

What does Lal Masjid signify? Is it yet another crisis, albeit grave, in a long series of processes that spell Pakistan's disintegration? Or can it be turned, especially, after the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Choudhry, into an opportunity to radically restructure Pakistani society and put it on the road to moderation?

Many Indian 'analysts', especially, military hawks, are chortling with glee at Pakistan's predicament —  Islamabad, which fervently promoted jehad, is hoist with its own petard! They dismiss all concerns about Pakistan's stability or integrity by asserting that these can be related to India only by reducing India's interests to 'parity' with a country one-eighth its size! Some argue that India cannot, and should not make peace with Pakistan's military. Rather, it should watch impassively, as Pakistan hurtles towards instability, political vacuum, guerrilla warfare and civil war.

Sober reflections suggest otherwise. Lal Masjid was admittedly the culmination of several anomalies and crises in Pakistan, including a crisis of governance and a crisis of political authority, besides Islam's long-term doctrinal corruption and its Wahh-abi reinterpretation. But it's also a crossroad. From here, Pakistan can either race towards State failure, or it can recover, democratise and 'normalise' itself.

Independent Pakistan's 60 years has been a story of many failures and very modest achievements. Pakistan was born in intense rivalry with India, struggled to define itself through religion, and never had a chance to stabilise itself as a constitutional democracy with crystallised parties and institutions — before it suffered the first shock of military rule amidst a crisis of civilian governance.

Pakistan's leaders allowed their country to be sucked into cold war rivalry at the cost of erosion of its national sovereignty, and by sustaining hostility towards its major neighbours. This increased the internal weight of an already overbearing military.

Absence of land reform and other measures to weaken the social stranglehold of the feudal classes meant that the infrastructure for civilian democracy remained weak, but the military bureaucratic complex flourished. Bereft of a State ideology with a universal, secular, modernist appeal, Pakistan's rulers sought legitimacy for themselves through religion, specifically, Islam, which they differentiated from its popular/folk versions and Sufi influences. But the appeal to religion could not save Pakistan from dismemberment and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh.

The Bangladesh crisis thoroughly exposed the myopia and anti-democratic character of the westernised Pakistan elite, and put a question-mark over the viability of the two-nation theory. Meanwhile, Pakistan's regional imbalances remained skewed, with Punjab dominating the nation and claiming a disproportionate share of its resources.