From CIA, with love

The US has the uncanny ability of turning most allies into its pet poodles. The  challenge is before India: will it start looking at all major global developments through the American prism, or continue to pursue an independent foreign policy?

Pranay Sharma Delhi

Growing up in the streets of Calcutta in the 1960s, it was difficult to ignore a much used three-letter word, 'CIA'. For reasons real and imaginary, the American intelligence agency, better known by its acronym, was perceived to be the most powerful organisation. For almost all failures and behind all conspiracies, there was the CIA. Later, a new word was added to our political lexicon, "the foreign hand". Clearly, those were the heydays of the Cold War and to a pre-dominantly 'Left-of-Centre' populace, it was easily acceptable to find the US as the most convenient scapegoat. This may have been particularly true of Bengal, but the same argument, to varying degrees, was used by most Indian politicians all over the country.

It is significant that at a time when India celebrates the 60th anniversary of its Independence, the US has yet again taken the centre- stage of the Indian political debate. The present crisis that the Congress-led UPA government faces may be over the India-US nuclear deal. But it is not about the merits of the deal, it pertains to a much larger debate — the future of India's foreign policy. The fears expressed by the Left, and shared by many others in the country, are basically about the 'hidden cost' that India may have to pay for its new-found friendship with the Americans.

The Indian polity, particularly its elite, has undergone a fundamental change in the past two decades. The weakening of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and its disintegration later diluted the 'Left-of-Centre' position that most opinion and policy-makers in India held earlier. The generation that grew up drawing inspiration from Vietnam and raising slogans in favour of the 'Viet-Congs' for their 'heroic fight against US Imperialism' is today gone. The Vietnamese leadership is now actively wooing the Americans for investment in the country and to ward off China's growing economic and political clout in the region. There is a growing opinion among the Indian elite that the country's future is integral to aligning with the US. For obvious reasons, many of them trash the Left parties for being the 'party-poopers'. They blame the Left for spoiling the fun and celebrations of what was to be India's moment of glory — the successful completion of the 123 agreement that allows civilian nuclear cooperation between India and the US.

But instead of condemning the Left parties, let us pause and reflect on their attempt to focus on a very important issue that requires a national debate. One can argue that similar debates should have taken place on issues like the Bombay riots, the implementation of the Srikrishna Commission report, the regular attacks on Muslims in Gujarat and other places of the country, the growing landlessness among small and marginal farmers, the unabated suicides of agricultural workers and farmers, the growing unemployment, the lack of proper health and education facilities for large number of people in India. These were the traditional demands of the Left and these were the issues that they had fought for in the past.

The Left is guilty of glossing over all these issues and not making any serious attempt to bring it to the national focus for a debate. One may even argue that the US government had no role to play, at least directly, in any of these problems. If the government of the day and its main allies like the Left, do not make any effort to initiate a discussion and to bring about a course correction to policies to address the grievances and miseries of a larger section of the population, one cannot blame the Americans for that. However, it provides an opportunity for political opponents of the government to 'hook-up' the growing resentment among the people of India to the opposition for the nuclear deal. A government that shows indifference to the needs of the people for most part of its five-year tenure in power may find it difficult to sell an agreement, as important as the nuclear deal, when the next elections are held.

Does it mean that because the Left has been 'hypocritical' on a number of key issues, they have no moral right to ask for a debate on the nuclear deal? Irrespective of the stand one takes on the deal, there is no denying that India's foreign policy today stands at crossroads. Serious doubts have been raised on whether the non-aligned stand that New Delhi has so far managed to adopt and pursue in dealing with the outside world, may now be in jeopardy.

There is a well-known cliché in foreign policy circles. 'A country has neither permanent enemies nor permanent friends. It only has permanent interests.' But what are India's interests? The debate that stems from the nuclear deal is fundamentally over this. Does India's interest lie in moving even closer to the Americans, as some sections actively favour? Or does it lie in maintaining its non-aligned policy?

The biggest challenge before the Indian foreign policy establishment since the disintegration of the USSR has been in finding the right track in the post Cold War era. Even when India was championing non-alignment, its tilt towards the Soviet Union was well-known. Its decision to remain silent, despite strong reservations, when Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan in 1979, is an example which shows that realpolitik and geo-strategic considerations were often the overriding factors to ideological positions.

In the absence of the USSR to lean on, India had to remove existing strains and build strong relations with the only remaining superpower in the world: the US. Interestingly, though many countries have tried to needle India for its present bonhomie with the US, most of them have in their own way tried to do the same whenever they got the opportunity. The trilateral axis between India, Russia and China has been brought to the forefront every time Moscow or Beijing has felt threatened by Washington in their own sphere of influence. The engagement that India has with China at present has much to do with the interest that the Americans have shown towards New Delhi.

Soon after the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998, the Chinese leadership had aligned with the Americans to force India to dismantle its nuclear and missile programmes. Japan and Australia had strong reservations about the tests and tried their best to put India in the dog-house; they have done a major course correction over the past years. Today, both want to woo India and be considered as its close allies. The same goes for the European powers, other countries in Southeast Asia, in the Arab world or Latin America.

Some of India's 'friends' in the Islamic world have expressed concern over the growing ties it has with the US. But despite being New Delhi's 'traditional allies' none of them ever made any serious attempt to block Pakistan-sponsored resolutions on Kashmir at the Organisation of Islamic Conferences or at other fora where they had influence. The point is simple: each country has been looking after its own interest and they will continue to do so. And India will also do the same.

There is little doubt that its friendship and closeness with the US plays an important role in what many in different parts of the world have been describing as 'its emergence' as a major player in the international arena. But the Indian leadership will have to be extremely careful on how it handles its future relations with the Americans. The US has the uncanny ability of turning most allies into its pet poodles. The challenge is before India: will it start looking at all major developments in the world through the American prism, or continue to pursue an independent foreign policy that primarily looks after its own interests.