High stakes, low priority

It is not too late to retrieve India’s image with the future of Nepal

Pranay Sharma Delhi

It is an that India, which tried its best to make King Gyanendra accept the "ground reality" in Nepal, had almost missed the point itself. A determined mass demonstration threatening to storm the palace on April 24 finally forced New Delhi to use all its influence and exert enough pressure on the recalcitrant dictator to bow before his subjects. 

India is watching the situation carefully with many policymakers cautious about the SPA’s ability to bring the Maoists towards a conditional disarmament and into the mainstream. The worry is that they are armed, hold considerable sway over the countryside, and may not like to play second fiddle in the interim period to a constituent assembly.

The Maoists too are wary of the SPA falling for what could well be a ploy of certain conservative elements of the international community working in concert with the king. This will happen if the SPA delays the constituent assembly and toys with the idea of tinkering with the 1990 constitution. The position of the Royal Nepalese Army, firmly under the palace, is another cause for concern to the democrats in Nepal.

Any widening of the gap between the SPA and the Maoists will prolong the crisis in Nepal with the difference that instead of the king, the SPA will be facing the armed might of the Maoists. This will have a negative impact for India.

New Delhi’s role has caused criticism. For a country with considerable stakes in Nepal, India intervention came too late, and was not well-managed. The decision to send Karan Singh as Prime Minister's "special envoy" to Nepal was not really a wise one. Though there was some course correction done by the Indian establishment to the decision by dragging out the foreign secretary Shyam Saran from Thimphu and asking him to be part of Singh's delegation, it was not the perfect start to its crucial campaign in Nepal. A large section of Nepal’s democrats have always been wary of India's links with Gyanendra. By making the former maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir the "chief negotiator" in the current crisis in Nepal, the Indian leadership gave the wrong signal about where its sympathies lay. 

The fact that India was allowing Gyanendra to get away literally with murder (at the time of Gyanendra's speech on Friday April 21, 16 people had already been killed and scores of others injured in the firing by Nepalese security forces) became apparent from the haste with which New Delhi decided to "welcome" the monarch's proposal.

Predictably, the seven-party alliance and the Maoists in Nepal rejected the king's proposal and promise to return to democracy. And along with that came the disappointment with India and the anti-Indian feelings started rising among the demonstrators. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs had the tough task of fire-fighting. India, with its enormous connections with Nepal’s political task could have preempted the situation by sounding out a spectrum of Nepal’s public opinion on its intended steps.

"We are not siding with this side or that side. We are with the people of Nepal and we are for the return of democracy in that country," Saran said at a hurriedly convened press conference on the night of April 22. But the foreign secretary's observation came at a time when India not only welcomed the king's proposal but also hours after the Prime Minister re-emphasised on "constitutional monarchy" and "multi party democracy" as the two pillars on which Nepal's "peace, progress and political stability" depended.

But in the face of mounting criticism both within and outside India, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government finally decided to take some urgent corrective measures, with constant nudging from its Left allies, to come out with a formula that could avert a head-on collision between the Nepali people and the king. In his restrained address to the nation on April 23 midnight, Gyanendra finally decided to revive parliament, the demand of the SPA. For good measures, he also expressed regret at the loss of lives of his subjects during the demonstration.

However, it is not clear yet whether New Delhi has finally decided to give up on the king or has managed to convince Gyanendra that this is only a tactical move to tide over the present crisis.

The twin-pillar theory that has formed the basis of India's policy towards Nepal does raise some serious questions after more than one and half decade—a time in 1990 when New Delhi was the main backer of the movement that brought parliamentary democracy in Nepal. One reason why India was the first one to welcome the king's proposal might have stemmed from the belief that its positive response would leave little room for the seven-party alliance to reject it.

But this is where India has not been in touch with the ground reality in Nepal. It did not realise that the king's proposal will be seen as "too-little-too-late" by the people of Nepal and it would be extremely difficult for the seven party alliance to convince the demonstrators who had been campaigning for a constituent assembly and a republic, to accept them. For once, the political party leaders in Nepal assessed the mood of their constituency correctly and knew that the king's offer was unacceptable and rejected Gyanendra's proposals.

It was the compromise between different domestic interests that led India to build its "twin pillar" theory with equal emphasis on a “constitutional monarchy" and "multi-party democracy" in dealing with Nepal. The pillars were contradictory from the start, a fact reflected in more than one article of the 1990 Constitution. The contradictions came to fore after Gyanendra became king after the infamous palace massacre of 2000. The palace dealt a swift blow to its own constitutional nature and demolished multi-party.

India had to tread a cautious line. Without abandoning the now mythical “twin pillars”, it had to facilitate a resolution of the crisis in its neighbourhood. "It is mainly due to India's efforts that the international community is today demanding for the immediate restoration of democracy in Nepal," Saran said in defence of India's committed stand on democracy in the neighbouring country.

It is a fact that India, in the past few years has tried to build pressure on Gyanendra for his decision to take away the power of the elected representatives. New Delhi had even stopped all arms supply to Nepal and stayed away from the Saarc Summit that was to be held in Dhaka early last year in the wake of Gyanendra's decision to take away all the power from the executive and turn himself into an absolute monarch.

It is also true that in the past several months the Indian leadership had actively encouraged political party leaders to come together so that they could launch a strong movement against the king and force him to take immediate steps to restore democracy. There was even a time when an obstinate Gyanendra forced some sections in South Block to think of a scenario in Nepal where the king was no longer relevant.

But India's biggest problem has always been in coming to terms with the Maoists in Nepal. Though the armed rebels have been dominating the Nepalese political scene for some years now, New Delhi has deliberately tried to limit their presence to the minimum and that too with the prefix that the Maoists are there because of the terror that they have unleashed in Nepal.

The failure of the Indian establishment to accept that stability in Nepal rested on the twin pillars of mainstreaming the Maoists and multi-party democracy remains the main weakness in New Delhi's links with Kathmandu today.

Urged by the Left parties in India, the establishment in New Delhi had winked at the SPA and Maoists’ negotiations. But that was done from the realisation that unless the Maoists back the seven-party alliance agitation against the king there was every chance of the movement dying away. But there lies the dichotomy. India wanted the Maoists to be there but as subordinates to the SPA. The moment in Nepal has gone way beyond this.

The Maoists had earlier said that they wanted to give up their arms under the supervision of an international agency or a neutral party like the United Nations. But India has had problems in the past with allowing the UN to meddle in political affairs in Nepal—a country that New Delhi considers as its backyard.

If India does not want the UN to come here it might have to take the decision to supervise the arms surrender and the elections itself. But it is not clear yet whether India is prepared to play such a role, and if indeed that role will be acceptable to the other players in Nepal. However, it is about time that India does take a serious look at Nepal and accept the "ground reality" where the Maoists have emerged if not as the main force but as a significant force in the country.

But more importantly, the leadership in New Delhi would have to accept the fact that the people of Nepal are no longer willing to accept the old political equations. The people of Nepal have discovered their power and are not likely to give it up. They are still not off the streets and are ready to go back again if they sniff a compromise that goes against the concept of people’s sovereignty. Nepal is undergoing a revolution and showing the region the way to an inclusive and peaceful future. India’s strong position in support of Nepali people’s will can help it finally find a positive mention in the annals of Nepal’s history.