Nepali democracy and assistance without interference

A hands-off international policy based on a realistic assessment of Nepal’s reality is recommended at this stage

Hari Roka Delhi

All that can be said of India's maladroit diplomacy in Nepal is that it has not sunk to the depths of European diplomacy, which involves peculiar activities, such as muscling into a meeting of the leaders of the seven party alliance (SPA) to thrust a compromise with Gyanendra down their throats, a move that was resoundingly defeated by the people on the streets of Kathmandu. Such fiascos, including India's awkward attempt to settle matters in Nepal by sending a defunct royal to deal with Nepal's crumbling monarchy, are the consequence of an inadequate understanding of Nepali realities.

The fact that the parliamentary old-guard is at the helm in Kathmandu, may lead some in the Indian establishment to believe that the old approach, based on outdated assumptions, can be revived. 

The palace cannot be written off yet and the royalists will be biding their time. The most important of these are the army top brass. Though they are legally now answerable to parliament, at heart their loyalties are with the king. As a result the army will in reality be functioning under dual command. Its ultimate loyalty is to the palace. What needs to be done at the earliest is to ease out the current army command to prevent the palace from making another bid for more power. The army top brass can find clandestine ways to disrupt the peace process, especially given that it has become accustomed to a high level of impunity since 2002. In 2003 peace talks were brought to an end when the army, without provocation, attacked a peaceful meeting of unarmed Maoist workers in Doramba.

Apart from this, the polity is set on a course of reconciliation with the Maoists. This has to be based on an acceptance of the Maoist demands that have popular support. However, it is likely that the parliamentary parties will accept political reform at present and try to prevent economic and cultural reform and for this they will get a lot of international support from US, EU and India.

But events have assumed a logic of their own and despite being fundamentally opposed to radical reform, so long as the principle of an elected constituent assembly is accepted by both sides, the two main parliamentary parties will end up appropriating the basic indisputable aspects of the Maoist agenda, including the need for economic and cultural reform. The three defining and fundamental facts about Nepal are that it has more janjatis (indigenous persons) and dalits than caste Hindus, that almost 90 per cent of its people are dependent on agriculture and that more that 70 per cent of the people live below the poverty line. These three numerically significant factors are sufficient to reformulate the agendas of all parties.

But before this there are other requirements of a more or less technical nature involved in meeting the aspirations of the Nepali people. It is clear that these aspirations will have to be met through the constituent assembly. But establishing the constituent assembly will require a clear understanding how to best ensure deep and wide representation of the people in the assembly and the degree of control they have over the proceedings.