Iron fist in a velvet glove

Be it in Europe or in Asia, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has more than filled the shoes of her predecessor Colin Powell

Kaushik Kapisthalam Atlanta

When US President George W Bush tapped his then national security advisor Condoleezza Rice to be his chief diplomat after winning a second term in November 2004, Washington circles were sceptical about the pick. As a successor to outgoing secretary of state Colin Powell, it was felt that Rice would have big shoes to fill. While Condi, as she is known, is known to have Bush's ear, Washington insiders felt that she would lack the rapport that Powell had with America's allies and foes alike. It now appears that Condi has worked quickly to dispel any doubts about her diplomatic skills while stamping her own imprint on Foggy Bottom, Washington's equivalent of New Delhi's South Block.

After a whirlwind trip to Europe that took the continent by storm, Rice completed a critical trip to Asia, with stops in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Japan, China and South Korea. That Rice's plate was full of critical and thorny issues indicates that she was willing to take up all the challenges without wasting too much time.

Condi's primary mission seems to have been to tackle the twin Asian nuclear crises in North Korea and Iran. With Pyongyang pulling out of the six-party nuclear talks in the Korean peninsula, Washington hardliners now want Rice to pressurise China to get North Korea back to the table. Beijing has long insisted that it does not have as powerful a leverage over North Korea as it is perceived to have, but that argument seems to be finding fewer takers in Washington. To add to the problems, US policymakers feel that South Korea seems to be moving towards a direction of constantly appeasing its northern neighbour and Rice is expected to carry a tough message to them to come on board.

US-Japanese relations seem to be headed for a major renaissance and Rice's Tokyo visit appears to further cement the ties. There seems to be a consonance in how Tokyo and Washington feel towards China of late. The US and Japan recently released a joint security statement that made it clear that they both oppose any Chinese military action on Taiwan and indicated that they will provide military assistance to Taiwan should Beijing try and take the island militarily. Experts feel that this was a significant statement and for the first time it officially shows the unease that China's neighbours feel about the Dragon's rapid military advancement. Rice is also expected to convey a blunt warning to Chinese leaders on the need for China to give its people more freedom as their economic situation improves.

Nowhere would Rice have been more welcomed perhaps than in New Delhi. Since 9/11, South Block mandarins as well as the wider Indian strategic community have developed a visceral dislike of Colin Powell for various reasons, not the least among which is Powell's overt cozying up with Pakistan and its dictator General Pervez Musharraf. To add to New Delhi's anger, Powell also kept pressing the wrong buttons like, for instance, his negligence to mention the US' granting of the major non-NATO ally military status to Pakistan in 2004 while he was visiting India just hours before. Powell's repeated interviews taking the credit for preventing war between India and Pakistan in 2002 after Pakistani terrorists attacked the Indian parliament on December 13, 2001 also grated Indian nerves.

Rice, during her days as an academic at Stanford University and as an advisor to then presidential candidate George W Bush in 2000, wrote on US-India relations, "There is a strong tendency (in Washington) conceptually to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states." She added, "India is an element in China's calculation, and it should be in America's, too. India is not a great power yet, but it has the potential to emerge as one." Such views have ensured that Indian strategists view Rice with respect and not as someone instinctively prejudiced against India, like Powell was perceived to be.

However, it was the tougher side of Rice that was evident in her press appearance after talks with Indian leaders on March 16. The top American diplomat minced no words as she expressed American displeasure at India's natural gas pipeline dealings with Iran. There are reasons for this. Rice has apparently risked the wrath of the all-powerful neo-conservative elements within the Bush administration when she asked for and obtained permission to change the tough American policy on Iran's alleged nuclear programme. While hawks like Vice President Dick Cheney want no part of the European-led talks with Iran, Rice has seemingly convinced Bush to offer concessions to Iran as carrots to induce change in the Islamic nation.

Washington diplomats would also like to economically isolate Iran and are already peeved at a $100 billion energy deal that China recently signed with Iran. An Iranian deal with India and Pakistan in this context would simply take all air out of the US economic threat to Tehran, experts asseverate. However, Rice was not all harshness in New Delhi and has seemingly lent a sympathetic ear to Indian concerns for supplying energy to a fast-growing economy. Rice apparently surprised many observers by offering to consider an Indian request to buy advanced American nuclear reactors. While many are still sceptical about Washington's intentions on this front, the very fact that the US is publicly talking about supplying nuclear reactors to India as part of the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" talks between India and the US is a sign of great progress.

It was in Islamabad, however, that Rice delivered her toughest message. In her press conference following meetings with Pakistani leaders, Rice made clear in no uncertain terms that the nuclear proliferation issue was her primary focus. She also kept hammering the point that the US wants not just A Q Khan out of business but also wants all the "tentacles" of the Pakistani nuclear network broken up for good. This was bad news for Musharraf, who has been seeking to put the episode behind him. To add to Pakistan's woes, Rice took advantage of a badly timed statement by Pakistan's information minister Sheikh Rashid Ahmed that Khan sent not just blueprints but actual centrifuges to Iran. One observer wondered if Rashid was asked to make the statement to gain brownie points with Washington, especially as Pakistan desperately seeks to get F-16 fighters and other weapons from the US. In any case, the admission gave another stick for Washington to beat Pakistan with for some more time.

And herein lies the big difference in style between Rice and her suave predecessor. Powell was all sweetness and cordiality, and he only released to the media what he wanted to get out. And often the leaks tended to convey a message somewhat in dissonance with the Bush theme. "Powell always gave out the hint that he is the lone voice of reason amidst a gang of hawks in the Bush confidante circle," an expert avers. In contrast, Condi seems to be, at least so far, totally on the Bush message. For instance, with Pakistan, despite the Bush doctrine of promoting democracy, the US policy seems to be to shore up Musharraf at virtually any cost. In her press briefings and interviews during and before the Pakistan visit, Rice was unflappable and refused to criticise Musharraf for his democratic failings despite repeated queries. "Condi is Bush in a dress," notes an Indian expert, "she cannot be steered away from the Bush message."

While Colin Powell always saved any tough messages for private meetings with barely anything released to the press, "in his 2002 and 2003 discussions with Musharraf, it now turns out that Powell had constantly pressured Pakistan on A Q Khan, yet there was barely a mention of it in his press conference or interviews," notes an expert. In contrast, Condi does not shy away from mentioning the fact that she conveyed a tough message to Musharraf on the nuclear issue in her public statements. "This must be unnerving to the Pakistanis, who always like to ride on the thin edge of plausible deniability when it comes to their promises to Washington," the expert says.

Analysts note Pakistan's quick "test firing" of the long-range Shaheen-II nuclear-capable ballistic missile immediately following Condi's Islamabad visit as a sign that Musharraf must not have liked the message he got from Rice.

These are still early days for Condoleezza Rice, but it now appears that she is comfortable being the iron fist of the Bush foreign policy execution machine, despite her "soft" appearance. There seem to be interesting years ahead for diplomats in Asia and elsewhere.

The author is a defence and strategic analyst based in the US