Destination Delhi: Fuel Station Bangalore?

Upbeat after its victory in Karnataka, the BJP has set its sights on Delhi. More often that not, the party has tried to conjure a wave out of a state election victory expecting it to build into some sort of a national continuum. Most election verdicts though are discrete functions of personalities in contest, regional alliances and some, purely local issues. The BJP that rode to power in 1998 and 1999 had a vastly different value proposition from the BJP that is seeking power in 2008. Two factors differentiated the BJP then from the Congress.

The BJP was then a largely untested force with Atal Behari Vajpayee bearing the halo of a martyr, standing tall. The BJP was the only national party seen as a business worthy ally and numerous states were ruled by those opposed to the BJP, thus setting the local anti-incumbency factor in favour of the NDA. None of these USPs are now unique to the BJP/NDA.

With a maturing electorate and increasing fragmentation, regional alliances and local issues are now deterministic factors. The 2004 elections proved better than any other that regional alliances and local incumbency sentiments can be the undoing of a national party, however popular its leader may be. States with a number of regional players are giving decisive mandates and hold the potential to make or mar the chances of the national alliance that they are with. Tamil Nadu (TN) has turned out to be as much a kingmaker as UP. Sample this: since 1991 only the alliance that has swept TN has made it to power at the Center.

The BJP's coming to power must be viewed in this context. In the late 1990s, the party had successfully complemented its ‘northern trump card' UP with its ‘southern' Tamil Nadu, on both the occasions that it made to power. The three largest states north of the Vindhyas that have the largest share of Lok Sabha seats are UP, Maharashtra and Bihar - together these states have 168 seats.

In the 1998 election, when the BJP and its allies first came to power, they pocketed 83 of these 168 seats. In 1999, the allies won 85 of these 168 seats. However, in 2004, the NDA was down to 46 seats. South of the Vindhyas, the BJP and its allies won 30 out of 39 seats in TN in 1998. This number stood at 26 in 1999. It was zero in 2004.

Pushed to the periphery in UP, divided in Maharashtra with a decimated ally and an uncertain alliance in TN make it a challenge for the BJP to get to the goal post with the same political arithmetic that saw it reach there in 1998 and 1999. The BJP and allies might shore up their tally in Bihar but that might not be sufficient to offset the loss of base in other states.

Unlike 1998 and 1999, the Congress now holds a strong value proposition for its allies - having proven its ability to run a coalition and accommodating allies. The party is on the verge of expanding its alliance in UP and seems to have options in Tamil Nadu. Post 2004, the BJP has never been able to proposition its allies as successfully as it did post 1996. The Trinamul Congress and the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) have distanced themselves from the BJP, while Jayalalithaa has not given a firm indication of tying up with the BJP.

Given these complex variables, the verdict in Karnataka could have as little to do with the result of a general election as the verdict in key northern states in 2003 had to do with the 2004 Lok Sabha elections.

Challenges before the BJP: It's no more the party of 1998/99 with a liberalist like Vajpayee as its and a convincing stride of ascendancy to get allies to flock to the party. Second, a frittering Congress in the late '90s provided a good context to the BJP -- the TINA factor. That is not the case now.