Reincarnation Redux

Will China allow the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet? Hardnews probes
PRANAY SHARMA BEIJING/LHASA

THE PROSPECT OF the Dalai Lama returning to Lhasa in Tibet at some point in the future allures and alarms Chinese leaders. He is one person they love to hate. Over the years, he has been the favourite and most convenient target Beijing has found to direct its ire and frustration at. But the sustained vilification campaign has also established him as the single most important authority among the Tibetans. He is perhaps the only one with credibility who can honour and bless any possible deal that China may want to do to resolve the Tibet question.
Any attempt to bring up the topic with Chinese officials is usually met with the standard official line: "He can return only as a Chinese citizen, disbanding his government-in-exile and accepting that Tibet is an inalienable part of China."
But behind the officialese lies the worry. What if he does return? What then?
The Dalai Lama's honeymoon with the communists, after they took over the country in 1949 and started taking control of Tibet from 1950 onwards, was somewhat uneasy and short-lived. In the initial years, he reportedly agreed to the Beijing initiated reforms in Tibet and survived in the post of vice chairman of the People's National Congress - the Chinese Parliament.
The uneasy alliance broke in 1959 when the Dalai Lama and many of his supporters fled Lhasa to take refuge in India after Beijing dispatched its Han Chinese dominated People's Liberation Army (PLA) to take charge of Tibet. Since then, relations between the Dalai Lama - who set up his Tibetan government-in-exile with its headquarters in the Indian hill station Dharamshala -and the Chinese leadership, have mostly been strained.
What was originally known as Tibet has today been divided into many other ‘autonomous' regions. The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), established in the mid-1960s with its capital in Lhasa, has left out "mixed areas" by keeping only those parts which Beijing claims have more than 80 per cent of the Tibetan population.
It was Hu Yaobang, as general secretary of the Communist Party of China, who, during a visit to Lhasa in 1980, brought about some changes in Beijing's Tibet policy. He realised that unless Tibetans were made to take charge of the administration, it would be extremely difficult for China to maintain its control over the people of this region. It was on his advice that the party leadership had decided to withdraw its Han Chinese cadres and bring in more Tibetans in the administration of TAR.
Hu's ‘soft line' seemed to have worked for a while. But from the late 1980s, trouble started brewing yet again in Lhasa and other parts of TAR. Monks from leading monasteries took to the streets demanding ‘greater autonomy' -- posing a direct threat to Beijing's Tibet policy.
President Hu Jintao, who was then the party secretary in charge of Tibet affairs, fell back on the ‘tried and tested' method by calling in the PLA to stamp out the rebel monks who initiated the unrest in Tibet. For the next 20 years or so, there was relative peace. Beijing took this opportunity of pushing through serious reforms by pumping in several billion dollars worth of investment for setting up infrastructure and other developmental projects in TAR. The region showed almost 14 per cent economic growth - the highest in the country in the past two decades. This might have allowed the Chinese leadership to breathe a little easy for a while.
However, the March 14 "riots" in Lhasa that killed 18 people, injured 800 others and damaged properties worth millions of dollars, showed there are still "elements" who were dissatisfied with the Beijing initiated reforms and were looking for something far beyond.
Predictably, the "Dalai clique" was blamed for the "riots" in Lhasa. China argued that with the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games coming up in early August, the Dalai Lama and his supporters were getting restive to create violence to bring the Tibet issue back on the international centrestage.
To a certain extent, the Tibetan exiles did succeed. The Olympic torch relay met with resistance in different European capitals, forcing the media and others to hotly debate the Tibet issue. But after a point it also started giving diminishing returns. Many Chinese - and this went well beyond the leadership - strongly disapproved of what was happening in different parts of the world and started seeing the Dalai Lama and his supporters as "party-poopers".
Whether it is in Beijing, Xining, Lhasa or Linzhi, or some other cities of China, a large number of people want the Olympic Games to be a success. Most Chinese look forward to August 8 - the inaugural day of Beijing 2008 -as China's moment of glory. And for the leaders in Beijing, the Olympic Games remain the best opportunity to announce China's "peaceful rise" to the world.
US President George W Bush has been consistent in his commitment to arrive for the inaugural of the Olympic Games in Beijing. Many others, who vacillated in the past, have done a course correction and expressed their desire to be in the list of invitees for the inaugural. The impressive guest list that include heads of government of almost all the important countries in the world and other celebrities, has been to the satisfaction of the Chinese leadership. They have taken ample precautions to ensure the Olympics go off without a hitch.
Perhaps it will, although nobody is ruling out the possibility of one or two Tibetan sympathisers sneaking in and breaching the tight security to raise a flag or a slogan, to prove their point.
But what happens after the Games? Will the Chinese leaders be sincere in engaging with the Dalai Lama to resolve the Tibet issue?
The next round of talks between Beijing's representatives and those of the Dalai Lama are scheduled for October. The Dalai Lama's representatives were extremely unhappy with the last session that was held in early July. Some fear that no meaningful progress will be made even in the next round of talks. They argue that China has been going through the motion of engaging with the Dalai Lama's representatives to ensure that there is no active support from him to disrupt Beijing 2008.
However, indications suggest that a serious debate is going on among the Chinese leadership on the future of Tibet and also on whether the Dalai Lama has a part to play in it. The official response is less encouraging. Dong Yunhu, Director General, State Council Information Office, Beijing told Hardnews, "We will not discuss the future of Tibet with the Dalai Lama, though we may discuss his future and that of his supporters with him." 
This may be the stated official line but the fact that senior leaders in Beijing still feel the Dalai Lama has a role to play was evident from the remarks made by Wen Jiabao during a visit to Laos some months back. He told journalists that China wanted the Tibetan spiritual leader to use his influence to ensure that there was no further violence in Lhasa. It was interesting that while saying so Wen did not use the derogatory term "Dalai" but the more honorific and respectful title ‘Dalai Lama' to make his appeal. Apart from the premier's choice of the title to address the Tibetan leader, his remarks and those made by other Chinese leaders and officials at different stages after the March 14 riots in Lhasa, shows that the Dalai Lama still wields enough influence in Tibet.
Perhaps this also contributes to the Chinese dilemma. While it may be a good idea to enter into a deal with him to seek a permanent resolution of the Tibet question, will China be able to handle the situation if he indeed decides to return to Lhasa?
In private, Chinese officials admit that no one is sure about the reaction if he returns to Tibet. The Dalai Lama is not only a "living God" to millions of followers of his Gelugpa sect, but also highly revered by other Tibetans. His influence over the other sects of Tibetan-Buddhism is substantial.
The March 14 incidents showed that there are sections in Tibet who are not satisfied with the current system and if need be, were even willing to take to the streets and resort to violent agitations to mark their protest. These sections and many others can rally behind the Dalai Lama, and then, the demonstrations in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet can create serious instability. The leadership in Beijing may find that hard to defend.
This brings us to the other important part of the question on whether it is in China's interest to get a deal in place while the Dalai Lama is alive or should it try to look for a resolution only after his death? Some feel China may actually be looking at a scenario when the Dalai Lama is no longer in the scene.

THE PRACTICE OF using identified ‘reincarnations' as a means of religious succession, which had begun with the Kagyu sect, is now prevalent among most other orders of Tibetan-Buddhism. The Panchen Lama is the second highest ranking Lama in the Gelugpa sect. According to Tibetan tradition, the confirmation of either the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama "must be mutually recognised". This means the ‘reincarnation' of the Dalai Lama has to be identified by the Panchen Lama and that of the Panchen Lama will have to be identified by the Dalai Lama.
Chinese officials argue that ultimately it is Beijing that has the final word in the recognition of either the Dalai Lama or the Panchen Lama. "This has been a practice since the days of the emperors and this was also followed during the identification of the current Dalai Lama," an official said.
There is a controversy over the status of the current Panchen Lama. Nearly 15 years back, China identified Qoigyijabu as the Panchen Lama. But the Dalai Lama claims Gedhun Choekyi Nyima to be the reincarnated Panchen Lama. The boy was arrested by the Chinese authorities in 1995 and had not been heard of since, while Qoigyijabu was recognized as the Panchen Lama and kept under tight security in Beijing. This has strengthened the view that China was in effect buying time and looking for a scenario after the Dalai Lama's death to consolidate its position. Since the Panchen Lama is under its control, the identified reincarnation of the next Dalai Lama can also be done as per Beijing's choice.
This may well be part of the thinking within the Chinese leadership about the future of Tibet. But a large number of Tibetan exiles remain outside the country whose position will only harden if Beijing tries to push through with this scheme. It will also allow many countries outside China - some of them important international players - to use this as a political stick to beat Beijing whenever the need arises.
Crucially, such a move will always lack credibility. A scenario where the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama are under its control can meet China's short-term policy goal. But if it is keen on finding a permanent solution and seriously wants to ensure stability in Tibet, it will have to enter into a credible and honourable agreement. And this perhaps can only be achieved with the 14th Dalai Lama. Whether Hu Jintao and the rest of the Chinese leadership opt for him is something worth waiting for - not only for the Tibetans but also for a large number of people outside the Tibetan community.
The writer is Editor, Strategic and Foreign Affairs, IANS. The views expressed are his own and not that of the organisation.