Choice of Crises

If India can't pull its weight in its own backyard, it is unlikely to become a player to reckon with on the global stage 

Srinath Raghavan Delhi

Contemporary Indian foreign policy is routinely described as a tale of the rise of a great power: the world's largest democracy taking its rightful place on the high table of world politics. The recently concluded nuclear deal with the US is seen as a significant step in this direction. The central problem with this narrative is that it is oblivious of India's handling of strategic challenges in its own neighbourhood. The record here is decidedly mixed. All too often, New Delhi has been caught out by unforeseen developments and has been forced to improvise responses. Even on issues where the initiative lay with it, India has been unable to push forward in the right direction. These trends are exemplified by India's approach to the multiple crises brewing in its neck.

Consider India's relations with Pakistan. The UPA government came to power at a time when India-Pakistan ties were on the ascendant. In 2003, Atal Behari Vajpayee, then prime minister, had launched an initiative to end the Kashmir dispute. Spurred by the changed international context after September 2001 and the increasing threat from the jehadi groups within Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, then president, threw his weight behind the peace process in 2005. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was quick to grasp the incipient shift in Pakistan's stance and declared that he was ready for any solution short of redrawing boundaries.

Subsequent back-channel talks between Indian and Pakistani diplomats SK Lambah and Tariq Aziz resulted in a framework agreement: no redrawing of the line of control; greater political autonomy to both parts of Kashmir; troop reductions by India in response to de-escalation of violence by militant groups; joint management of issues of common concern such as water, power and communications; opening the LoC for trade and travel. The agreement would at once preserve both sides' interests and enable them to avoid loss of face.

New Delhi, however, wasted precious time considering when and how to make the agreement public. The Indian leadership's prevarication stemmed at least in part from concerns about how the agreement would fare in the domestic political marketplace.

India's inability to seize the moment consigned the peace process to a limbo. Musharraf's departure from office has left India with no strong and credible interlocutor with whom a deal can be struck. The centres of power in Pakistan are in a state of flux and it is not clear when the framework agreement will be taken up again - if at all. This is a pity, for recent moves such as opening the LoC for trade and the announcement of elections in Kashmir should have been part of a settlement. Instead, India is forced to adopt piece-meal measures, which are unlikely to have much impact on the underlying problem.

Furthermore, there is an increasingly vocal body of opinion in the US which argues that the Obama administration should push both sides towards a settlement. If the history of such attempts is anything to go by, overt US involvement will make it domestically difficult for India to reach a settlement, and will encourage Pakistan to stake out for more.