Frame a RESPONSE

For any modern State, the complexity of the problem requires an equally complex response by the government
Manohar Thyagaraj Delhi

India and the US are two peas in the same pod, a pod of nations that is threatened by the spectre of trans-national terrorism. Both countries suffer threats from the same sources. To maintain civil liberties in multi-ethnic societies and to secure their populations, they are faced with similar challenges. Are there lessons for India from the US experience post-9/11?

After terrorists attacked Mumbai on November 26, 2008, the carnage generated moves toward reform in India's internal security set-up. Chief among them were the creation of the National Investigative Agency (NIA) and the mooting of a national coastal command, which would assume overall responsibility for coastal security in India. The cabinet secretary has been given co-ordination responsibility for policy related to coastal security.

Before going into any of the more specific arguments about India, it's important to draw a generalised distinction between planning and procurement in the defence space and that in the space broadly termed homeland security.

In a military sense, the battle-space between combatants is generally well-known. Moves, counter-moves, grand strategy and doctrine are all programmed for and well understood. In homeland security, the problem is more complex as the battle-space is diffused among local populations, creating 'noise'. On this 'noise' is superimposed the rapidly changing tactics and methods of terrorists.

For any modern, democratic State, the complexity of the problem thus requires an equally complex response by the government which stresses on variables as diverse as bureaucratic re-organisation, change management, process design and technology incorporation.

The place of technology in this 'response spectrum' is worth noting. A very easy response for any State to make is to throw money into procurements. These procurements can be claimed
as immediate responses to satisfy political pressures.

However, the long-term effectiveness of such procurements can legitimately
be questioned. Incorporation of technology without creating a defined CONOPS (Concept of Operations) can be counter-productive.

• § Nominally, the process of arriving at CONOPS, from which a technology roadmap should flow, would go through the following stages:
• § Strategy development: High level consensus to be built on policy, including analysis of the limitations of current legislation and procedures
• § Enterprise architecture and CONOPS development to follow this strategy consensus
• § Modelling and simulation to validate the CONOPS

The US embarked on such a response after the tragedy of 9/11. One of the first examples of the results came in September 2002 when the FBI arrested five of the 'Lackawanna Six' outside Buffalo, New York, based on intelligence suggesting that they could be involved in planning of a terrorist attack on US soil.

As India seeks to learn some lessons from the US post 9/11 experience, one critical comparison with the Lackawanna arrests and subsequent apprehension of terror suspects in the US bears notice: India lacks a federal agency with arrest powers.

Till date, none of the suggested reforms in India addresses this question. Without it, the time lag between sharing of intelligence with state agencies and their response to move into position to apprehend suspects could prove to be operationally decisive.

This point is used here only to illustrate that organisational creation or change without addressing larger underlying issues would render any reform incomplete. Thus, the procurement of technology before institutional analysis, reorganisation and CONOPS definition would be inadequate.