New prism for India’s Afghan policy

The level of goodwill that India has attained among the common Afghan is commendable. But such gains need to be supplemented by adapting New Delhi's broader strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan 

Zorawar Daulet Singh Delhi

Despite having emerged as one of the leading suppliers of developmental assistance in Afghanistan, India has been unable to leverage the "soft power" of aid and societal goodwill earned in Afghanistan to shape political outcomes. A clear distinction has now been drawn between Afghanistan's "immediate neighbours" and a second tier of regional states that includes India.  

On the eve of the just concluded London Conference, the UN Security Council removed five former Taliban officials from its sanctions list. The Conference has clearly legitimized a framework for the return of the Taliban as a player in Afghan politics. Pakistan's role as a potential enabler in this process of future reconciliation has also been explicitly recognized. To be sure, this trend has been apparent for some time (See my piece last October http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2009/09/3267). Nonetheless, a "talk talk, fight fight" strategy by the western alliance has now been set in motion and the next several months will reveal the efficacy of this path.    

 As the Indian Foreign Minister reiterated in London (January 28), "The principal objective of India's development partnership, covering the entire country and straddling all sectors of development, is to build indigenous Afghan capacities and institutions." Yet, India's $1.3 billion in development aid has not prevented New Delhi from being relegated to the periphery of high politics over Afghanistan.  

The principal reason why India has been unable to exercise more orthodox instruments of power is the absence of a direct geographical supply line to Afghanistan. Ignoring the logic of geography, a segment of India's strategic community has been impetuously advocating a deployment of troops into the Afghan theatre. The proponents for an Indian military deployment have also not accounted for the lack of expeditionary capabilities in India's armed forces that could sustain a large scale deployment over an extended period.  

Thus, throwing boots into the Afghan theatre would more likely imply Indian forces forgoing their operational autonomy and accepting an overwhelming reliance on US/ISAF command and logistical infrastructure. Given the scaling back of western goals in Afghanistan and a lack of strategic convergence with India's preferred outcomes in the Hindu Kush, ceding operational autonomy over Indian forces would be imprudent and negate the original intent of projecting Indian power.

 On the other hand, by acknowledging that there are structural limits to India's ability to influence geopolitical outcomes in Afghanistan, New Delhi might be able to forge a more realistic policy where the ends and means are on the same page. Such an exercise would also enable India to evaluate and employ multiple means to advance its geostrategic interests on its western frontiers.