New prism for India’s Afghan policy

The level of goodwill that India has attained among the common Afghan is commendable. But such gains need to be supplemented by adapting New Delhi's broader strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan 

Zorawar Daulet Singh Delhi

Despite having emerged as one of the leading suppliers of developmental assistance in Afghanistan, India has been unable to leverage the "soft power" of aid and societal goodwill earned in Afghanistan to shape political outcomes. A clear distinction has now been drawn between Afghanistan's "immediate neighbours" and a second tier of regional states that includes India.  

On the eve of the just concluded London Conference, the UN Security Council removed five former Taliban officials from its sanctions list. The Conference has clearly legitimized a framework for the return of the Taliban as a player in Afghan politics. Pakistan's role as a potential enabler in this process of future reconciliation has also been explicitly recognized. To be sure, this trend has been apparent for some time (See my piece last October http://www.hardnewsmedia.com/2009/09/3267). Nonetheless, a "talk talk, fight fight" strategy by the western alliance has now been set in motion and the next several months will reveal the efficacy of this path.    

 As the Indian Foreign Minister reiterated in London (January 28), "The principal objective of India's development partnership, covering the entire country and straddling all sectors of development, is to build indigenous Afghan capacities and institutions." Yet, India's $1.3 billion in development aid has not prevented New Delhi from being relegated to the periphery of high politics over Afghanistan.  

The principal reason why India has been unable to exercise more orthodox instruments of power is the absence of a direct geographical supply line to Afghanistan. Ignoring the logic of geography, a segment of India's strategic community has been impetuously advocating a deployment of troops into the Afghan theatre. The proponents for an Indian military deployment have also not accounted for the lack of expeditionary capabilities in India's armed forces that could sustain a large scale deployment over an extended period.  

Thus, throwing boots into the Afghan theatre would more likely imply Indian forces forgoing their operational autonomy and accepting an overwhelming reliance on US/ISAF command and logistical infrastructure. Given the scaling back of western goals in Afghanistan and a lack of strategic convergence with India's preferred outcomes in the Hindu Kush, ceding operational autonomy over Indian forces would be imprudent and negate the original intent of projecting Indian power.

 On the other hand, by acknowledging that there are structural limits to India's ability to influence geopolitical outcomes in Afghanistan, New Delhi might be able to forge a more realistic policy where the ends and means are on the same page. Such an exercise would also enable India to evaluate and employ multiple means to advance its geostrategic interests on its western frontiers.   

For a start, it is worth articulating the essence of India's goals in Afghanistan since India has been remarkably coy about spelling out the raison d'être of its Afghan policy. From the very start, Afghanistan for India was all about Pakistan. The post-9/11 phase of India's Afghan policy was essentially one of bandwagoning with a superpower seeking retribution for 9/11 in the hope that Washington's strategic ire might eventually fall upon the principal source of international terrorism - Pakistan. The opposite has occurred. Nine years on, the continuing western military presence has only managed to transform the principal benefactor of the Taliban - Rawalpindi - into an indispensable partner in the American mission in Afghanistan. Such is the logic of geography! 

India, it would appear has expended a significant amount of diplomatic capital since 2001 to ensure that the western military presence in Afghanistan remained unaffected by the India-Pakistani security dilemma. India's strategic posture and outlook were remoulded to ease the presence of the western alliance in Afghanistan. This was achieved by initiating a policy of reassurance vis-à-vis Pakistan and quietly absorbing blow after blow of asymmetric proxy assaults that extended into the Indian heartland. The illogic of this entire policy path and the assumptions that preceded it were finally confronted by the Indian security elite in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror strikes in November 2008. In retrospect, what began as a policy of reshaping western perceptions vis-à-vis Pakistan after 9/11, gradually transformed with India bending its own goals and security perceptions to suit the western military intervention in Afghanistan. In other words, India was adapting its strategy to serve tactical imperatives! 

Now that this charade is over, New Delhi can once again reassess its posture and policy goals vis-à-vis Afghanistan only this time by relating it explicitly to a grand strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. Plainly put, Afghanistan was envisioned as one of the means to modulate Pakistani behaviour. The ultimate goal was always a roll back of the military-intelligence superstructure in Pakistan and the irredentist aspirations of the ruling elites toward either side of their frontiers. The ISAF and US forces never shared such expansive goals in Afghanistan and therefore have been unwilling to expend blood and treasure to emasculate India's troubled neighbour.

 Now that events on the ground have denuded India's Afghan policy, perhaps the moment has come to end our obsession with Afghanistan and start evaluating the utility of other national security instruments to advance the same overarching objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan that we envisaged on the eve of 9/11.   

Given enduring geopolitical constraints, India cannot play a great game in Afghanistan. For a state that lacks geographic contiguity with Afghanistan, the level of goodwill that India has attained among the common Afghan is commendable. But such gains need to be supplemented by adapting New Delhi's broader strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan. A renewed focus on the Radcliffe Line and toward the security of the Kashmir valley would be a start.    

The writer is an international relations analyst at the Centre for Policy Alternatives, New Delhi and can be contacted at zorawar.dauletsingh@gmail.com