AFGHANISTAN- WHAT INDIA SHOULD EXPECT AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO

Vikram Sood, the former RAW chief explains the situation in Afghanistan and also puts forth the options available to India

Afghanistan has been at the cross roads of great empires and thus a scene for frequent/brutal conflict but never under the control of any outside power for long.

In the last 30 years Afghanistan has seen the effects of a Communist takeover promising liberation from feudalism and assuring equality, a religious bigoted group establishing itself spearheaded by US led Islamic zeal, followed by the US attempts to give the hapless country liberty and equality. Today we once again see the return of the Taliban and the US eager to negotiate with the same ideology and the same people they wanted to overthrow in 2001. There are many who say that this is actually a display of ethnic nationalism under the guise of a religious movement.

Situation in Afghanistan is a very complex one with a number of actors - internal and external, conflicting interests and capabilities. It is not likely to change in the next few years.

• This includes the various ethnic nationalities of Afghanistan.
• The warlords and their vested interests in the production and smuggling of narcotics, and arms.
• Corruption alone is a US $ 2 billion industry. A weak government in Kabul without any viable succession option visible.
• Its inability to exercise any control outside Kabul is well known. It has weak army and law enforcement machineries; their growth is hindered by factors of corruption and local ethnic interests. Attempts to establish an ANA and ANP have been slow and arduous.
• Most importantly, there is more than one group operating inside Afghanistan and many from Pakistani soil.

There are a number of external players and their own interests. The US and its allies want to make US free of any terrorism emanating from Afghanistan which is a threat to them and their allies. To do this they rely on Pakistan whose interests are different from the American interests and whose co-operation is less than forthcoming. Having made Pakistan totally indispensible to their cause, US has allowed Pakistan to play the spoiler. Pakistan, obsessed with India, has assumed that the control of Kabul slipping into the hands of the Taliban and that the Taliban being under their control would leave them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis India. The Pak establishment has endeavoured, successfully so far, to keep India out of any international arrangement aimed at solving the Afghan tangle.

That being so, a solution to the problem is equally difficult.

There are several kinds of insurgencies afloat in Afghanistan since 2002.

The Quetta Shura in South and Eastern Afghanistan . Sirajuddin Haqqani in Pakhtia, Pakhtika, Jalalabad . Salafis of Hayatullah in Kunnar and Nooristan. Hizb- e-Islami of Hikmetyar but have now mostly been fighting under the banner of Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban, their own sub groups according to region and clan, and their various associates from the LeT , JeM, SSP, LJ.  And then, there is the Al Qaeda.

For the present Pakistan may exult. It presumes that the inevitable and hopefully substantial departure of the US/NATO would leave it with the much sought after strategic depth.

It is difficult to predict if and when the US will change its decades old policy of pardoning Pakistan all its transgressions. What we need to take into account is that one of these days the US will carry out its much vaunted but ridiculously inadequate much delayed surge, declare mission accomplished and thin out. Its long-term policies are dictated by election year compulsions. Once the coalition forces begin to pull out a few things will inevitably happen as other interests try to fill the empty spaces. It is a retreat by another name. It is different from the Vietnam quagmire because the Vietnamese did not come after the Americans for vengeance. The Afghans will. Istanbul and London are the markers for the retreat. Although US may put whatever spin it may want to.
Pakistan will naturally assume that its moment has come again and it could now acquire its much dreamt strategic depth, throw the Indians out and be the overlord in Afghanistan.

• The Iranians are unlikely to remain idle spectators as a Sunni Wahabi neighbour is going to be an unsettling factor for them.
• Saudi Arabia on the other hand would want a Wahabi regime in Afghanistan that would check the Iranians and hopefully also keep the anti-Saudi extremists in Afghanistan.
• The Chinese have already begun to move in with their commercial and resource interests into Afghanistan as they would see an opportunity to move closer to the Persian Gulf, given their steady relations with the Iranians. The Chinese would see themselves moving into empty spaces up to the Persian Gulf vacated by a retreating American empire without having fired a bullet and lost a man. They also need to keep the Islamist extremists away from sensitive areas like Xinjiang so their presence in Afghanistan and image might be an insurance against the marauding extremists.
• The Central Asian Republics and Russia have their concerns about the dangers of Talibanised ideology spreading into their countries. Russia is realigning; so is Japan..
• Finally, the absence of a strong centralised authority will only create more confusion in a country that has been run on drug money and foreign doles.
• Pakistan's exultation may be temporary. Unable to control its own territory it is unlikely to be able to run Afghanistan in the way it may want to. It does not have the resources to do so and the US, hopefully, may not sub lease Afghanistan to Pakistan this time. The other very real danger is that the Pushtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, joined together in a common fight for decades, may well ask if they fought all these years only to end up being minorities in both countries. The departure of the Coalition Forces will only add to the instability of the region and India needs to prepare itself for this eventuality.

It is an accepted fact of history that the Taliban were the creation of Pakistan. But what is not known today is the degree of control Pakistan exercises on the Taliban.

Either way it is feared that there will be a destabilising effect on PK. One would doubt if the Pashtun/Taliban will rest after assuming power in Afghanistan. A victorious Taliban in Kabul is less likely to accept the Durand Line.

Rahimullah Yusufzai in a recent article in the News (February 2, 2010) made this very astute observation when he said that the  "Return of the Afghan Taliban to power whether by force or some peace process, would definitely raise the spirits of the Pakistani Taliban and likeminded jihadis and thus lead to  fallout on the situation in Pakistan." He added that "There is bound to be fallout on Pakistan when the world's most powerful armies are involved in the longest war in the US and NATO history in neighbouring Afghanistan. And the fallout is to be expected because the US and NATO consider Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas as theatres of the same war and have thus deliberately named their strategy to deal with the challenge as Af-Pak."

If the Taliban succeed in Afghanistan then one can expect a repeat of what happened in India after the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan. There will be far too many of unemployed jihadis in Pakistan who would want to continue their jihad.
The status of the Afghan army and the police

The dilemma is that losing is not an option for the US; stalemate is strategic defeat for a superpower; troop augmentation to the extent required is unacceptable, and even a surge of 40000 is difficult. The much talked of Afghan army is still a ghost army.  Ann Jones in her report in the Nation (Sep 21, 2009) had described the Afghan Army as a figment of Washington's imagination. It does not exist in the numbers claimed, it is untrained, many of the recruits/trainees are repeats who come back with new names for the money, the food and the equipment they can take away and sell.  It is a frightening thought to have a man trained with rubber guns for three weeks, then given the real gun and sent off to fight battles for his country.

This became apparent when the Helmand campaign began last July and the ANA could muster only 600 men, far short of the 90000 that are supposed to be enlisted. The hope that Afghanistan will suddenly have an efficient 134000 strong army in two years is very much a false hope. What should worry Washington is that there have been reports of demoralisation and self-doubts among some sections of the US forces.  The state of the Afghan police is even worse with 60% suspected to be on drugs. Ill equipped and ill trained, they are easy pickings for the Taliban.  No wonder Pakistan will continue to hedge its bets with the Taliban, targeting only those that they see threatening them. They are aware also that NATO countries may not be able last out in Afghanistan much beyond 2010.

There are many Afghans who do not see the Taliban as necessarily bigoted or evil; they see the possibility of a more rational Taliban regime once the US has left.

Striking deals with the Taliban
It is presumed that some kind of a deal will be attempted in the months ahead. Mullah Omar will accept to negotiate only after the US /NATO leave.  If the US objective is to get rid of foreign militants then the Taliban may be more willing to talk. But the trust deficit is huge.

The Afghan/Pashtun/Taliban fear is that the surge and augmentation of ANA/ANP would eventually mean more targets, more damage more explosions - more deaths and destruction. This would be a part of the surge.

All indications are that the US/NATO will commence withdrawal/disengagement around mid-2011. It is necessary for us to think of the post-US situation. The West had made it their business 8 years ago to get rid of Al Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan to make America and its friends safe. Today, they rationalise and prepare for a dignified exit by saying that Al Qaeda is not really in Afghanistan while the Taliban are a reality, so the world must deal with this reality.

There are talks of good/moderate Taliban and the hardcore/bad Taliban. These are essentially rationalisations to set the new discourse. Moderate Taliban or those who will be weaned away from the main Taliban and may not have the authority to deliver what they promise. It is doubtful, if Taliban would strike a deal with the US under pressure from the Pakistanis on terms that are more favourable to the Taliban than to Mullah Omar. Attempts to divide the Taliban have essentially failed. In India we should stop post-event rationalisations on behalf of the Americans.

Options to Pakistan
One sees a new mood in Islamabad post Istanbul and London. A new mood of assertiveness, self confidence and aggression is visible in Kayani's statements and Qureshi's choreographed obduracy prior to the talks and collective theatrics afterwards. Pakistan will up its demands with Washington in the months ahead. For India it will do likewise. The cue this time will be water. Pakistan will buy additional insurance for itself in Afghanistan while keeping its options in India open and up the ante in Kashmir.  This will be to provoke an Indian reaction and get out of having to take sterner action against the Taliban in Balochistan and Afghanistan.

• One can expect the following in the next few months from Pakistan:
• Intefada type protests in Kashmir
• Provocations to keep Indian Army engaged yet seek their withdrawal
• Terrorism in the rest of India.
• One can expect continued terrorist attacks in Afghanistan against Indians and Indian assets to frighten away India from Afghanistan since persuasion through the US has not succeeded.
• Water will be the issue that will be used to unite the people against India as the temperature in Kashmir is raised.
• Consolidate in Afghanistan by making itself a party to any negotiations that the Americans may have with the Taliban, so that Pakistan remains in control
• Insulate and preserve India-specific terrorist organisations for use from time to time.
• Talk to India which would be showcased as a favour to the US

What should India do

• Indian primary interest is to prevent Pakistan from using Afghanistan as a base for terrorist activity in India.
• The other interest is to seek access to Central Asia through Afghanistan and Iran, since Pakistan will not oblige.
• It would be self defeating to withdraw from Afghanistan at this juncture after the attack in Kabul because this is what the Pakistanis want India to do. India must therefore continue with its present policy of providing infrastructure and financial assistance to the Karzai government something which has earned India tremendous goodwill in that country.
• It is hoped that by staying on and continuing this assistance under greater safety guarantees from the Afghan government could help strengthen Karzai's hands.
• India needs to develop contacts/strengthen them as the case maybe with all sections in Afghanistan, with different power centres and ethnic groups, including the Pashtun and the Taliban too.
• Russia, China, the Central Asian Republics and Iran are all extremely wary of the spread of Wahabi Islam and its destabilising consequences. These are the other interested regional powers with whom India must seek common ground to address common problems.