The Evolving Situation in Afghanistan and Some Brass Tacks

Intriguingly, the international community is not addressing itself to the core issues that are responsible for the situation in Afghanistan
By Shrinivasrao S Sohoni, Kabul

"How is the situation there?" is a question one is not infrequently asked about Afghanistan from outside. The situation being grim, the answer, "Quite serious" often works to close out talk on the subject. But sometimes, depending on the locus standii of the questioner, there are further queries, and then, time and mood being suitable, a discussion could ensue -- involving geopolitics, regional and super power aims and policies, international narcotics trade, Afghan domestic politics, Islam, more so: radical militant Islam, NATO military strategy, tactics and operations, and Taliban guerilla warfare and propaganda, et al. 

The fact of the matter is: things are really quite serious, and getting worse each day - as seen from the viewpoint of someone interested in peace in Afghanistan, - not the icy peace of a morgue or a 'peace' enforced by the edge of the sword, but a meaningful peace engendering progress and human happiness. 

Almost nine years since October 2001 when it expelled from Afghanistan the Taliban regime of Mullah Omer, the US, leading a 43 nation coalition, appears unable to suppress Al Qaeda or the Pakistan-based armed insurgency - funded by Saudis and the narcotics trade. Even as insurgency now actually has grown and menaces all of Afghanistan, more than ever, and is making inroads also into Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirghizstan, public opinion in the countries forming the coalition is turning increasingly averse to continued military involvement in Afghanistan. 

As a possible further complication, nomad Kuchi-Hazara armed conflict is apprehended in the near future, over grazing rights in the central Hazarjat highland region of Afghanistan. This involves potential internal ethnic and sectarian strife - Kuchis being nomad Pashtun Sunni Muslims, whose movement of sheep flocks to grazing areas in the highlands is resented and opposed by the Shia Hazaras. 

Kabul City itself being populated on tribal and ethnic lines, the possibility exists of consequent tension and ethnic conflict in Kabul as well. Yet another complication in this connexion is that the Uzbek community, known for its ferocious fighters, is presently said to be aligned with the Hazaras. The situation lends itself to exploitation by the armed opposition and its sponsors; equally by elements in Iran supportive to Shias in Afghanistan. 

Various factors are cited for the worsening state of affairs. It is standard for western media to carry critical reviews of the Government about not eliciting enough popular local approbation and support to pit the people of the country against the armed opposition, and for being unable to implement the latter two components of the 'Clear, Hold and Build' approach of the iconic ISAF Commander, Gen. McChrystal. 

The Afghan National Army, the Afghan National Police and other security agencies are found fault with for lacking the necessary efficiency and commitment. Sub-national governance authorities are pilloried for inadequacies in local administration. 
But such reports do not pass muster as unbiased or adequate representation of the factual position. 

Significant governmental achievements in Afghanistan, e.g. the fact of 7 million children now going to school, including millions of girl children - (who the Taliban would prefer being kept illiterate, sequestered and walled-in at home) - are achievements claimed by foreign donor agencies and governments, not attributed to the Afghan Government to which credit is in fairness due for executing the difficult task of such important social sector reform.