In the volatile chessboard of the Middle East, where desert sands conceal fleeting alliances and ancient grudges, the clashes in southern Syria between Sunni Bedouin tribes—many infiltrated by jihadists linked to or inspired by Daesh (ISIS) or Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda—and the Druze community are not merely a reflection of the thirst for revenge among a Sunni majority oppressed for 54 years, but revealing symptoms of the structural fragility of the new Syrian order following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024. The victory of the coalition of Islamist and jihadist militias that defeated the fallen regime has failed to secure total control over the entire territory. Terrorism remains omnipresent in the country, from Daesh and Al-Nusra, which have massacred innocents in Raqqa and Mosul with a barbarity that must be condemned without equivocation, to the presence of Iranian proxies such as the Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian Hezbollah, or the Iraqi Shiite militias that participated in the civil war in support of Bashar, forming an essential part of the Al-Assad terror apparatus. The sinister Axis of Resistance is biding its time to deliver bloody blows to Sunni communities and the new regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa, in an effort to restore control of Syria to its Iranian masters.

As a diplomat and analyst with decades of experience in the region, I approach this topic with academic rigor, balance, and pragmatism, far removed from ideological extremes but firm in the absolute condemnation of terrorism in all its forms: from the barbaric Sunni jihadism of Daesh and Al-Nusra, which has demonstrated its contempt for human life through countless atrocities, to the indiscriminate acts of Iranian proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, or Hamas, which undermine regional stability through state-sponsored terrorism.

For discerning English readers, it is relevant to cite the analysis from the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in its report Syria’s Sectarian Fault Lines Post-Assad (July 2025), which warns of escalation risks, or detailed reporting from The New York Times on tensions in Suwayda (July 21, 2025), fueling cycles of vengeance and atrocities that yet to bet thwarted.

1. Context of the Clashes

The clashes erupted on July 13, 2025, in the province of Sweida, a historic Druze stronghold in southern Syria, near the borders with Jordan and Israel. According to Reuters (July 19, 2025), Sunni Bedouin tribes, driven by territorial disputes exacerbated by post-Assad instability, launched attacks on Druze positions using heavy weapons and artillery. Estimates indicate that the known number of victims so far (undoubtedly many more) exceeds 1,300 deaths—based on BBC assessments (July 20, 2025)—and thousands displaced. These Bedouin fighters are not mere nomads; many among them are radical elements, former terrorists from Daesh or Al-Nusra, repurposed into local militias but clinging to their bloodthirsty ideology, which views Shiites and Druze as heretics to be eliminated and Christians as infidels deserving only death.

The situation is extremely unstable: following Assad’s fall, the power vacuum has revived ethnic and sectarian grudges. Sweida, with its Druze population wary of the new regime under Ahmed al-Sharaa (leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, HTS), has become a small but terrifying hell on earth. Mass murders by decapitation of women and children, throat-slittings, hurling men from rooftops and finishing them off, ripping babies from their mothers’ wombs. In short, the catalog of atrocities would make Attila’s raids pale in comparison. The Bedouins, economically marginalized, see these clashes as an opportunity to seize land and resources, while the Druze, with their warrior tradition and communal cohesion, respond with local militias to defend their autonomy. Despite a ceasefire announced by the Syrian government on July 19, the fighting did not cease; the Bedouins withdrew, but terrorist elements that had joined them continued their offensives. This violence forms part of a broader pattern: in a fragmented Syria, Sunni jihadism exploits disorder to reassert itself, reminding us of the horrors of the past decade.

Mutual kidnappings triggered a new escalation. The Syrian government deployed troops ostensibly to restore order, but in many cases, some units actively participated in the carnage against the Druze. This scenario underscores Syrian volatility, where the government is unable to control the most violent and radical elements within its ranks. Terrorism, far from being contained, remains a grave threat to minorities, and the lethal combination of sectarian violence and terror prevents any sustainable national reconstruction. As The New York Times reports in “Syria’s Druze City of Sweida Engulfed in Cycle of Vengeance” (July 18, 2025), these clashes have claimed over 272 lives among government forces, illustrating a vengeance cycle that destabilizes the regime.

2. Israel’s Military Support for Syrian Druze

Israel has intervened directly to protect Syrian Druze, “combining ethnic solidarity with security imperatives,” as government sources told The Times of Israel (July 21, 2025). Israel sent humanitarian aid and medical equipment to Sweida overnight from July 20-21, in coordination with the United States, while allowing limited access for Syrian troops to the area for 48 hours to enforce the ceasefire. Reuters details that Israel conducted airstrikes since July 15 against Bedouin and Syrian government positions, hitting tanks and artillery in Damascus and Sweida. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared: “Israel will not allow the Druze to be massacred” (CNN, July 15, 2025).

This support is not unprecedented; Israel maintains historical ties with the Druze, many of whom serve in its armed forces and security services. Israeli sources have repeatedly stated that the intervention responds to fears that jihadists infiltrated among Bedouin tribes could advance toward the occupied Golan to carry out attacks. Despite what appeared to be successful mediation between Al-Sharaa and Israel by the United Arab Emirates, some analysts believe the ultimate goal of the intervention is to weaken Al-Sharaa’s regime. However, the weakness of Damascus’s new regime only benefits the ayatollahs’ regime, which is waiting for its chance to reestablish dominance over Syria. The Brookings Institution, in “Violence in Syria’s Druze Region: Implications for Regional Stability” (July 21, 2025), analyzes how such interventions, while security-driven, risk exacerbating regional tensions—a critical issue for U.S. diplomacy in the Levant.

3. Demographic Distribution of the Druze Community in the Middle East

The Druze community, an esoteric ethno-religious minority derived from Shiite Islam, is strategically distributed across the Middle East, where its communal loyalty often proves decisive in regional conflicts. Updated estimates for 2025, based on Al-Monitor (July 15, 2025) and DW (July 17, 2025), provide the following figures for Druze communities:

• Israel: Approximately 152,000 Druze (1.6% of the population), including the Golan, integrated and loyal to the state.
  
  
• Lebanon: Some 256,000 (5.5%), concentrated in Mount Lebanon, influential in politics with leaders like Walid Jumblatt.
  
  
• Syria: Around 700,000 to 1 million (3%), mostly in Sweida, neutral in the civil war but now vulnerable.
  
  
• Jordan: 15,000-20,000, a highly influential minority; my old and good friend, Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ayman Safadi, is Druze. The majority is integrated in the kingdom’s north.
  
  
• Iraq: Fewer than 5,000, scattered and marginal.
  
  
• Turkey: 20,000-30,000, in the southeast, often assimilated.
  
  

These numbers highlight the Druze’s cross-border vulnerability, exposed to sectarian violence, particularly from jihadist terrorism that views them as dangerous heretics. The Wall Street Journal (July 2025) evokes this fragility in an article on Druze neutrality under strain, noting how these communities, influential in Lebanon and Jordan, become prime targets in Syrian chaos.

4. Iran’s Influence in the Conflict and Its Efforts to Regain Positions

Iran, weakened by Assad’s fall—its essential pillar in the sinister “Axis of Resistance”—seeks to regain influence by exploiting Al-Sharaa’s weakness. The Stimson Center (January 29, 2025) indicates that Tehran has lost its logistical corridor for arming and funding Hezbollah but persists in rearming Shiite militias in Deir ez-Zor and Aleppo. Responsible Statecraft (2025) reports intercepted arms shipments destined for proxies like Syrian Hezbollah, responsible for atrocities against Sunni communities.

In Sweida and this rekindled blaze, Iran sees a breach to weaken Al-Sharaa, now regarded as one of its worst enemies. The Carnegie Endowment (January 31, 2025) details how Iran “buys” local loyalties (corruption is one of the execrable Iranian regime’s specialties, practiced with great success in Europe as well) and funds Shiite militias to counter Turkish and Sunni majority influence. The Atlantic Council, in a recent note (July 2025), analyzes these maneuvers as Tehran’s attempt to reconstitute its Shiite axis, a direct challenge to Western interests in the Middle East.

5. The Structural Weakness of the New Syrian Government

Al-Sharaa’s government lacks effective territorial control, and its inability to rein in its most extremist followers and keep at bay Sunni jihadist terrorism as well as that sponsored and fomented by Iran is the central cause of episodes like Sweida. Al-Monitor (July 18, 2025) analyzes its “withdrawal” from the area, exposing fragile authority: it truly dominates only 60% of the country, with the Kurdish northeast and Idlib still autonomous (ICG, March 28, 2025). The regime’s weakness is compounded by a fragmented national army and an economy in complete ruins despite substantial and generous aid from Gulf states (SWP Berlin, March 18, 2025).

6. Internal Trends and the Weight of Jihadist Radicals

Internally, HTS radicals dominate, with highly radical elements—former Al-Nusra militants (like Al-Sharaa himself)—in key positions, prioritizing ideology over competence (Atlantic Council, July 2, 2025).

7. Ahmed al-Sharaa’s Inability to Control the State Apparatus and Militias

Al-Sharaa controls neither his government nor allied militias. The Middle East Forum (July 17, 2025) cites massacres of Alawites (March 2025), attacks on Christians in Aleppo, and now against Druze, violating solemn commitments made to the UN for scrupulous respect of minorities (January 2025). Haaretz (March 9, 2025) describes jihadist coalitions acting independently, underscoring the new regime’s impotence, inseparable from its extremist past (New York Times, February 25, 2025).

Conclusion

These clashes reveal Syrian precarity: a weak regime, persistent and lurking Iranian influence, as well as the bloody and resilient jihadist terrorism that is far from a terrifying ghost of the past. The fragile Syrian house of cards is, moreover, threatened by an internal and regional fire it lacks the means to control. Israel, Turkey, and other regional powers would do well to extinguish the blaze rather than add more fuel to it.

Gustavo de Arístegui is a Spanish Diplomat, Author and was Spain’s ambassador to India (2012-2016).

(Cover PhotoCredit: Canva)

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